Marv Amos Interview by Jerry Barrett

BARRETT: This is Jerry Barrett talking. Today's date is June 2, 1986. I'm interviewing Marvin Amos at Greensboro, North Carolina. [I forgot where I was] Mr. Amos, could you start by talking a little bit about what you did before you came with Eastern Airlines?

AMOS: OK. Quickly, to summarize, I started in the personnel area with RCA. Stayed there a year and this was after the Korean conflict. I was fortunate enough to get into World War II and then get called back for the Korean conflict. But went back to Europe as sort of a paid vacation. But when I got out, I went to Florida for a period of time to just -- in fact, for a year and a 00:01:00half and then I got a call from RCA. And I went to work for them in the personnel and training area. Stayed about a year and then got a call from General Electric and went to Chicago. And I started there as Manager of Training and then took over as Director of Compensation and Training and such with the Hotpoint Division of General Electric Company. And it was during the period of time that General Electric Company was coming in to take over Hotpoint. They had always owned them, which I didn't know, ever since Hotpoint was started. They would set 2 appliances in a store and I didn't realize they were both owned by the same company. But it was during the period of time that they were going to transition and close Hotpoint. I didn't know that when I went there but they were going to close Hotpoint and build an appliance park in Louisville and make all of their appliances — GE and Hotpoint — and just put a different label 00:02:00on it under the same management. And so I stayed there 4.5 years. An excellent experience because General Electric is one of the best places to learn personnel policies and stuff. Then I moved to Curtis Wright in New Jersey -- Woodbridge and I went to work there with what used to be the old engine division during World War II, World War I, no II. And I went in there as Assistant to the President and Director of -- they call it industrial relations, which is personnel labor. And it was during the period of time that they were making -- most of it was government work. They unfortunately, never got a contract to build the jet engines. They thought they was going to get it, but they never got 00:03:00one. It was a good company, but it really grew up to be a very, very large company during World War II and I'm under the impression about 95% percent of the air traffic engines, piston engines in World War II, were made by Curtis Wright. They took over plants like Studebaker and, in fact, Evendale, which is the largest plant was General Electric now - was built for Curtis Wright during the war.

BARRETT: Is that right?

AMOS: And they managed that plant.

BARRETT: In Cincinnati?

AMOS: In Cincinnati. That's Evendale. It's very, very large and built to be an engine plant, but not a jet engine plant. And then Curtis Wright did not get any experimental or research because of the fact that they unfortunately had the government over the barrel because every spare part had to come from them. And 00:04:00they made a lot of money on spare parts, but got out of airlines business. I mean they are in the aircraft engine business and I stayed there 4.5 years with good experience. And then went, I got contacted to go to work on a job that Eastern had. And at that time the Director of Personnel — see, it was consolidated. Personnel was not quite as centralized as when I left, but centralized. The Director of Personnel, Warren Gable came into the company as a secretary to Eddie Rickenbacker. Took shorthand and he was his secretary. And he grew - went up through the ranks. They were going to retire him in a year. And 00:05:00so I came in as a Director of Personnel Research — a title that was really made up - and reported to the Senior Vice President, Ralph Skinner, which was similar to the job that I had when I left. I reported to him directly for 1 year with the idea that in a year I would take over personnel.

BARRETT: What year was that you joined Eastern?

AMOS: 1965, January 1. And so I stayed the year - my family was in New Jersey — and spent half time in New York because that's where Skinner actually had an office, and half time down in Miami doing a lot of travel and trying to get to know the airline industry. And then a year later, I became Director of Personnel. And stayed in that job as Director of Personnel and we put out field offices and did a lot of reorganization during that period of time. And then 00:06:00moved to Vice President of Personnel. And I don't remember the year probably 8-10 years later. Didn't fill the Director of Personnel's job and had the Vice President of Personnel. And then took over labor and became Senior Vice President of Personnel and Corporate Administration and didn't fill the Vice President of Personnel's job. So really had eliminated the Director of Personnel's job, the Vice President of Personnel's job. And had the Senior Vice President and had about 14 direct reports really because my style of management is to get down to the ranks rather than to have a lot of the various laborers. There are a lot of levels, so that generally. And then I retired. Started to 00:07:00retire in October which would be 9 months before. And then worked on organization of specialists' projects for Frank until I became 60, which is when senior officers are supposed to retire — bar policies. And it will be 2 years coming up in July that I retired.

BARRETT: Okay. So it was in '84 that you retired?

AMOS: Yep. Born in '24 and retired in '84.

BARRETT: A lot of things, a lot of things happened during that period.

AMOS: Total, total different company, really.

BARRETT: Who are the various presidents you worked for there?

AMOS: When I went to the company, Floyd Hall had moved over from TWA as general manager there. And David Rickenbacker, I never met. But as you know, he passed away in England and the only report I had was that he did come back on the base. And we honored him when they brought his body back. But he was gone. Floyd Hall 00:08:00took over and changed the image of the company considerably. He's more of a market -- he's pilot actually, with the pilot [inaudible]. But came in and put the new logos that we now have and took us out of the old wheel club, started at least, and did a lot for the company in that regard. And ordered the jet engines which we didn't have, the 727s. But put the place order in that and he stayed for a period of time. And then during his stay, I think right at the end of it is when Frank came in

BARRETT: Oh yeah.

AMOS: - as executive - I don't know whether it's executive, but anyway he took over the operational part of it, maintenance, pilots. And that's where he started. And then Hall left and Sam Higgenbottom, who used to be Maintenance 00:09:00Vice President, took over the company for a period, I think probably 2 years, maybe 2.5 years. I'm not positive. And then Frank moved up and became President. Although we did have a presidency that worked for — Lewis was President for a period of time, but he was never the top man. Hall was really the top man during the period of time. Hall was, I think, the top man for a short period of time when Higgenbottom was there and then left. And I think Higgenbottom had it by himself for a period of time and then Frank took over and took all of it — the President and the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board.

BARRETT: You got to know Frank well during that time, I take it?

AMOS: Yeah. I guess I got to know him the best when we were reorganizing the company. He made a decision that probably should have been made 10 years before, to eliminate the New York office. And at that time there's a feeling that you couldn't run a company the size of Eastern without being in New York City. And that was a myth but that's what everyone thought, but it's not true. So we really went to work to try to consolidate because it was very, very expensive in that all the senior officers had 2 offices and 2 secretaries — 1 in New York and 1 there. And if you reported to a senior officer or 1 level before, you spent most of your time trying to find where he was and get with him. It was hard to manage at that time. Hard for Frank and everyone else. So, one of the best decisions I think he ever made was consolidating the offices. The second 00:11:00one, I think, was probably ordering jets, the 300, at such a good price. Probably, I would say, one of the 2 major decisions that he made, I think that had a big effect on the company. So I got to know him when we were trying to consolidate. He had established, even before he got into it, that he would like to get down to 40 officers -- from 73 -- and cut the directors in half, which is a title below officers. And then — not the Board of Directors, the directors title. And then he also wanted to whittle down the managers and see if we couldn't get a lot of levels out. And he thought a good time to do it - which was true - was when we were closing executive office.

BARRETT: In New York?

AMOS: In New York. And so during that period of time we were heavily involved with Frank directly on the reorganization and we did get down to 41 officers and eliminated.

BARRETT: That was pretty dramatic.

AMOS: That didn't happen overnight, but it happened probably within 6 to 8 months. Once something is decided by Frank, instant results. It's not the normal slow process. He's restless until it's completed. The longer it takes, the more restless he gets. That's just his style or makeup. So, we went to work and consolidated a lot of the departments, bought whatever office was left. We did leave finance — still that worry about could you run a corporation as large as ours without your finance department. So we did leave finance the last group to 00:13:00move. And it was through the finance department we probably lost the most people because it's like advertising department. If you're not in New York, you're not in advertising. And that's probably true of finance. If you're not in New York, you're not going to have an opportunity to —

BARRETT: Some people were not willing to go south then.

AMOS: That's right. And some left. In fact, the President of TWA was with us as treasurer in New York. Now he's President of TWA's Hilton division. Ed Myer was our treasurer. Not our top-dog, but our treasurer. So we went from, I think 7 floors in the Eastern building down to 1 floor on the ninth floor, which is what we have today. And we moved our sales, New York regional sales — actually the 00:14:00operations and sales into, on that floor, too. So they have now still the same organization. The Vice President of the Northern Region Sales and Service is now on the ninth floor, is Tupper. But we did keep an office and they are still there. Frank has an office there that anybody can use who is in New York. And Charlie Simons, who is the first - the chief financial officer at that move. And now Wayne Yeoman has — I guess if you want to say who's in New York today and it happened to be Frank, he'd be in that office. But if he wasn't there, anybody would be in the office. And that's probably one of the smartest moves we made. It put us all together to where we should be in Miami.

BARRETT: I take it that you had a good bit of administrative experience as well as labor personnel.

AMOS: Yeah. Labor was not my strength. I didn't have labor at RCA. I didn't have it at General Electric. I had it for 4.5 years at with Curtis Wright. I didn't have it when I went to Eastern and didn't have it until I got into where I took over labor after I had became the officer in charge of all of personnel and labor. So I took it over then -- Wayne Andrews was actually the Vice President in charge of labor.

BARRETT: Um hmm. I see.

AMOS: We sort of had parallel for a period of time, but a very short period then put it together. I didn't really — labor is not my love.

BARRETT: OK. OK. So, I was wondering whether Frank Borman depended on you somewhat during this reorganization for some of the ideas of about how to pull that off?

AMOS: I think totally on that. I think that was -- one of the things that I seemed to be most pleased with was reorganization. Reorganization, organization and compensation if you have to list your strengths, would be mine. And the structure that we set up way back then is still the structure that they are operating under today, basically. And the salary structure that they now have, I think is the same one that we put in some years ago. So administratively and then those 2 areas, that's probably my strength.

BARRETT: OK. Some of the interesting things that I've heard about so far that 00:17:00happened at Eastern, kind of covering the period from say 10 years ago to today, kind of begins with efforts in the - after 1975 to reduced compensation, the total compensation bill. And one of the earliest things was the Variable Earnings Program. Can you talk about that a little bit? Where that came from?

AMOS: Actually, the Variable Earnings Program was the second program we put in. We had a freeze, which is what I think one of the first in the airline industry and the first, I think in the major companies when not only airline companies were having trouble, but all the companies had inherited a pay structure that really goes back to World War II, truthfully.

BARRETT: Um hmm.

AMOS: Where that - any company that was heavily associated with a service, like 00:18:00all of our pilots came from a service and most of our mechanics came from a service, and the company contributed during the wartime effort. So any of those companies that were like war-time-type companies are built from war-type servicemen –

BARRETT: Okay. Okay.

AMOS: -- came back and built a very strong union-type of a deal. And that's I think, any of those companies that would -- Curtis Wright was one that had that problem. In '77, '76, '77 — in that period there were a lot of industries that were overpaying in regard to their competition. And as the new upstarts, whether it was deregulation or not deregulation, had a big gap between their pay structure and the one that we had inherited. So in '77 we were having our 00:19:00financial problems and we were able to get all of our employees to give up their increase for the year. And I think they were due about an 8% percent increase. So the pilots, the IAM and our agents, the non-contract group, which always consist about a half of your people, we had them to vote — which, I think, is the first to have non-contract people vote - as to whether they want to give up or not. And they are still carrying that forward now. In other words, if you're going to let the organized groups vote to give up a freeze in their increase, you best let your non-contract -- in fact, in my philosophy, you must or you're going to have them organized.

BARRETT: Yes, yes.

AMOS: So we spent a lot of time. Frank leading it. But we went around and made 00:20:00speeches after speeches and charts after charts. During that period of time he put out a general policy that said twice a year an officer would go to each location. Like I was actually here during that period at one time not knowing that I would end up living close here. But he would come up with — we had slides and we would talk to all employees together, not separate. And it was through that system that was already in existence that we went out and sold the freeze in '77.

BARRETT: Right.

AMOS: And what happened is, instead of you getting an 8% percent increase for that total year, we withheld it. And that gave us the use of the money for that year. And then at the end of the year, we reinstated that 8% percent, not a back - didn't pay it back, but your salary would be increased 8% percent. And then we 00:21:00would go forward with whatever other increases that you were entitled to, either by contract or by our compensation program for the non-contract. So that was really the first, I think good, overall labor relations of the personnel program, that a large company as large as — I don't know of any that got a four-year freeze to use the people's money. And then from that — we no more than got over that instantly and then we went into the selling process of the VEP. We really started that prior to the end of the year. Spent about 3 months communicating so that we could, in giving back this year's freeze, we didn't feel that we wanted to give it all back. And we went out and got the 3.5% percent Variable Earnings Program. And I think that was somewhat of a first and 00:22:00it was for 5 years. If we made X-amount of dollars, then we would pay back a percentage. Over the 5-year period, I'm under the impression that we gave close to 58% percent of the money back — none one year and maybe some back the next year. But it's my feeling that during that 5 years we were beginning to turn the company and I'm not sure deregulation came in - was it '79 or '78? But during that period of time and things then got fairly tough. But we did have that 5-year program of all employees which you can choose to take stock or had various options. But it's a fairly good program and worked.

BARRETT: Where did that idea come from for the variable earnings? Do you recall that?

AMOS: I think — I'm not sure if there's anyone that had the total gem but I think that we were -- Frank, myself and I think probably some finance people and everything were just shooting the breeze. You know, we can't get another freeze. What could we do to get the people more involved in our problems? And the best way to get them involved is to relate getting their money back or not getting it back based upon profit. And during that 5 years, I think we made a lot of progress although it didn't seem to show, but you had to know how tough it was before we started it in getting anything. So it was during that 5-year transition where we spent more time communicating and visiting and they were a part of the profit of the company as to whether they'd get their money back or 00:24:00not that we started what, I guess the employee involvement, but not the official program that they now have which I'm not in favor of. But -

BARRETT: The one they now have you're not in favor of?

AMOS: I'm not in favor of an outside consultant coming in and trying to make the union officials and managers change their style of management. I think you have to do that within. Probably Frank and a lot of people wouldn't agree with that but, in my opinion we've now got too much management by the union through that type of a program. And I don't think the program is alive very much today, which is a good indication of it. It sure didn't accomplish much because we don't have the IAM in the program this year. And we did get some benefits, but I think employee involvement has to come about like the VEP program, rather than a 00:25:00formalized structure and an organization called People Involvements and special committees and all this type thing because you never get rid of them. And all it does is allow an organized group to take their political people and put them on a non-working status by putting them on a committee. And so you tend to attract the hard-nosed union officials when you organize in that type of a fashion.

BARRETT: Oh okay.

AMOS: Rather than the normal employees who happen to be organized. So I think that period of 5 years was a good period. And had deregulation not come, it would have been a total different company because we were way ahead of the other airline companies in dealing with our employees. Because there are a lot of 00:26:00airline companies that haven't yet got a freeze. They did, but a long time after we got our freeze in '77. A long time after we got the VEP.

BARRETT: So if deregulation hadn't come along right at that time -

AMOS: We would have been a leader.

BARRETT: Oh isn't that something?

AMOS: We would have been a winner because we happened to start first. We had made our organizational moves and cut - you can't go to the employees and ask for any money when they think you are over structured. You got to clean your structure up.

BARRETT: Right. So that was done first.

AMOS: That helps you. There's no way you can sit with 70 officers and some people having double offices and try to sell a damn thing to the employees. It's just not going to work. And I don't think they should accept it. I think you got to do your homework - managerial homework -before you go to them and ask for 00:27:00money. So that's why we spent so much time and why I still rate closing of the New York office and streamlining the organization in getting out 30-some odd officers and 250-some odd directors we got and 500-some odd managers. A tremendous amount. Now, we didn't — the money that we save because we didn't change your title from a director to a manager and take money away from you. But from an employee-image standpoint, we had less directors and we had less managers and over time we got the money savings,

BARRETT: Um hmm. Um hmm. Was that done in what you might call a humanitarian way? Were people eased out or how was that done?

AMOS: We really didn't — we let go from officers. We gave, we demoted -- I don't think we fired anyone that was a director or a manager and said now, 00:28:00you're out on the street. We offered them another position, didn't cut their pay, but hurt their status and maybe their promotional opportunities down the road. So it's very much a humanitarian-type of approach. No question about it. You can't succeed by not doing it that way because you're going to have to live with their friends. Even though you may fire someone, he's got 10 friends that's going to be with you for a long period of time.

BARRETT: You got to take that into account.

AMOS: Yeah, yeah. There was no one we would walk up to and say you're fired. We had people that didn't care to move to a new city, didn't care to be demoted. And that was their choice.

BARRETT: Yes. But they were given a choice.

AMOS: And we took care of them when they left the company. We didn't treat them as a normal person that would walk in and say I don't want to move, I'm quitting. Because, in fact that's what they did.

BARRETT: One of the things I've heard in connection with the Employee Involvement Program is that historically Eastern has had a management style that is very hard-nosed. Would you characterize it that way? There was a need for them being a little bit more — involving employees a little bit more and that's why it was so much needed at Eastern. Would you characterize it that way or not? And I think that story goes back to Rickenbacker — that idea, that he was that style.

AMOS: He's very tough, hard-nosed type. He's really not any tougher than Frank. 00:30:00Frank is very tough and I think the reason that we have been labeled sort of a hard-nosed-type of a company, even though we were out communicating more than anyone else and even though we were involving the employees more than any other company, is the fact that Frank becomes very personally involved with the employees. And he's like an Arnold Palmer; he's got a charisma that draws people. They relate him coming out and meeting -- walking out on the ramp and meets everybody. If he were to come to Greensboro today — it made no difference where he was going to speak — he'd be out on the ramps shaking hands with all the employees before he went to his other meeting. That's just the way he is. He enjoys it and with his astronaut, the employees enjoy it.

BARRETT: Um hmm. Oh yes. Yes.

AMOS: Because he's sort of an American hero. You don't get to shake hands with many of them. So he had 2 things going - his personality, which lend to a charisma. So what happens is that when you get that closely involved as a chief executive officer and I'm not saying this critically. It was just a style. I would not do it that way. Just a style. He became very close, either by phone or by visits with the labor leaders, and that makes it very tough because he talks to them like you and I are talking — very friendly — and so does labor relations people. But the minute you've got a problem, they think they've got a 00:32:00friend in Frank Borman and they do. But it makes it very tough for you to sit down and negotiate around the table when they've spent an evening with Frank Borman or a 2-hour discussion with Frank Borman directly.

BARRETT: Okay.

AMOS: And in the labor area, I mean any employee you want to go as high as you can go and as long as you get to know by the labor rep and they know who the manager in charge is, they'll go in there. And if they know the vice president, they'll go in there. If they know the senior officer, they'll go in there and they're going to go to Frank.

BARRETT: Oh okay.

AMOS: So it makes it very tough. And so when they would go to Frank and he would say no, that gave them an image – "Hmmm?" I just shook hands with him and he said no. And he is sort of hard-nosed except when he wants to say hello to 00:33:00us. And think it all relates to his personal involvement with all groups of employees in a friendly way -

BARRETT: Okay.

AMOS: - and then, when they want a 10% percent increase and we don't give it to them down below, and when they go to him and he doesn't either, they relate to management as being hard-nosed. That's the only way that I can —

BARRETT: Oh okay, okay. Okay. It's almost as if they are surprised and disappointed that he would say no after being so friendly.

AMOS: Yes. And it's hard for him to say no, by the way. It didn't come easy.

BARRETT: OK. I've heard him described as being pro-employee, that is to say he is very favorable toward –

AMOS: He is but it's very hard to be that close with employees. I think he is only one of the few chief executive officers that you could walk to a filling station attendant 10 miles away from the airport and he would know who the 00:34:00president of the airlines was because some employee said I just talked to Frank Borman. I think if you could go to American Airlines and all the rest of the large companies and they had never seen their chief executive or didn't know his name. And by the way, you could go to the press in most cases and they wouldn't know. But they would know Frank Borman was head of Eastern Airlines because of the astronaut area and the type of guy he is.

BARRETT: yeah. He lives rather modestly, too.

AMOS: Very, very modestly. He is not a typical senior executive. He didn't grow up in the structure of, you know, coming up from director to manager from his status in the service. He just sort of transitioned into the executive life. But isn't a typical executive from the style of living. He's not impressed with the 00:35:00title, which is unusual. But see, he didn't grow up in the industry area. TWA, they had a general -- let's see if I can think of his name — who was strictly image-oriented, coming from a service. It was a type of people. He's just a different type of person. They have a club. It's called the Conquistador for airline executives and senior executives. And they all get together for about 4 days out in Wyoming. Just a friendly get-together. Very helpful. Get to know a lot of people you talk to on the phone. I never belonged. Frank happened to be 00:36:00our member but I happened to go as his guest twice. And then he dropped out of the club because that's just not his style.

BARRETT: Um hmm. Oh yeah. Okay. That says a lot, doesn't it?

AMOS: It's not his style. He really doesn't care to go out. He went a couple of years to it — more than 2 years. I went with him twice, but he didn't have to have that and preferred not to have it.

BARRETT: When deregulation happened in the late seventies, you already referred to that as what a big impact that was on the recovery of the company, really. Were you surprised at how extensive the impact was? Or was that anticipated?

AMOS: No. I think probably we were more concerned with it than most of the other airline companies because we knew it was going to have the biggest effect on us. 00:37:00We were certain that in all of our presentations prior to, we were not against it. Because I think deregulation is the name of the game in American industry. I wished it would have waited about 10 years, but I personally was for deregulation and I don't think the company ever took a position that we were not for it. But I think they moved it too fast and didn't let any company really get ready for it and didn't think it through quite well enough. And they deregulated the skies but didn't deregulate the grounds, for example. And it was a traumatic experience both for the labor leaders and for management. And the reason it hurt us was several. We were in the largest of the 25 largest airports, we were 00:38:00probably in 24 of them. And you knew that if you were going to start deregulation, you're going to have to start a lot of new companies. They are not going to start with Greensboro to Charlotte. They are going to start New York to Miami. And so the impact had to be greater on Eastern Airlines. And also we were very much aware that our financial condition would hurt us quicker than it would hurt the others. And it happened to come out like that. So we probably were the management of Eastern with Frank reminding us that we were going to get hurt the quickest and then we did. I think the first year of deregulation we got invaded with 43% percent of our routes and I think everybody else was around 26. Because -

BARRETT: That's quite a significant difference.

AMOS: The People Express are not going to — New York Air, for example whose - they got into the shuttle business. And if you're going to start an airline with 4 planes, you want to put it where's there's a lot of people. And so we were in the large airports. In fact, we were what, 36% percent of the planes coming out of New York of the 3 airports at one time. And it turned out to be that and it's still that way, I think. If you look at the records, we have had more invasion on our routes. See, we had the choice routes. That's what the company was worth. And overnight we lost our value.

BARRETT: Um hmm, um hmm. Even the problem of generating new funds for new equipment and stuff like that was made more difficult by that I think, by the loss of your primary routes.

AMOS: No question about it. No question.

BARRETT: Then instead of raising equity to the stock market, you had to borrow.

AMOS: Yeah. And the problem is that we built a big terminal – you know airports are built with that, airlines for a 99-year lease. So we expanded and built a big terminal at JFK or any city. And you know, all at once you've got to give some of that space to an upstart company. And here we are owning, paying all this rent 24 hours a day and they come in and want to get a gate for 3 spots, you know, when there's a lot of people in here. And they don't want to pay for the 12 hours that there's nobody in here. So here's a good example. We built this terminal and we're sharing it now with Peoples Express, I see. Going 00:41:00out on our designed concourse.

BARRETT: Um hmm, um hmm. That's sort of the downside of the competition.

AMOS: That's why I say they deregulated the airlines after we built the ground facilities.

BARRETT: That's a good way of putting it, a good way of putting it, um hmm. Well, beginning in the eighties, there were almost a continuing series of negotiations up to today almost, with the 3 major unions at Eastern. Can you talk a little bit about those negotiations?

AMOS: Yeah. First of all, I think one of the things that's been a big problem for Eastern and maybe, maybe because of the fact that everyone of our chief executive officers, with the exception of Higgenbottom, has been a pilot. And I 00:42:00tend to feel that the pilots have used my co-pilot to an advantage. Because our pilots are probably the finest pilots on an individual of 1 to 2 and if you put 3 together, then they are a different character. They really have in my opinion, been the greatest problem. A lot of people think it's the IAM and I'm not saying they're not only about 2 points lower. But the pilots have really had outstanding contracts. And they have them in other airlines, but I think that they have been the toughest. They're the most professional. They know they got 00:43:00you over the barrel because you can always get a mechanic very quickly, but you can't get a pilot very quickly. And they are our biggest expense, particularly to Eastern Airlines when we were growing into the jet fleet faster than probably most airlines. And that is very, very expensive to do when you have a pilot contract like we have. And it's not a lot different from the other airlines but it affected us worse because when we would bring 1 new 727 in, we had to train and train and train probably X-number of crews as they move up. And then as we would add the 1011s, you got the same bumping process.

BARRETT: I see.

AMOS: So every time you bring 1 new aircraft in, everybody gets retrained 00:44:00practically. And then at that time also which was just a matter of, unfortunately, that the World War II pilots started leaving us. So every time you get a crew trained to run a 1011, he retired. Or we'd bring 1 more in and then he'd have to upgrade and 1 retiring, and that's a tremendous cost to an airline. So we had that factor that probably was unknown but a very big expense to us,

BARRETT: And it's primarily because of the requirements in the labor agreement that all –

AMOS: Yes. All of this is in the labor agreement. Now we did in one pilot negotiations — I wasn't involved with the pilot contract negotiations from a benefit standpoint. I had a manager of benefits always in the area, but they really only talked seriously with pilots. And so they — we'd always be a party 00:45:00to it because what we did there, we had to do to the other. But those are very, very tough contract negotiations because they really have more power and their effect on you is really tremendous.

BARRETT: Your reference earlier to the use of the co-pilot. By that - and the 3 pilots, the 3 pilots in the cockpit, you were just referring to the idea that 1 pilot at a time is OK. Two pilots talk to each other, OK.

AMOS: I wasn't talking about any co-pilot. I said, if you had 3 – if you had 2 pilots out to dinner, they would be the finest people you ever dealt with. If you ever brought 3, they would get into negotiations.

BARRETT: I gotcha, OK.

AMOS: No, I didn't mean anything to do with the cockpit.

BARRETT: OK. Yeah. I gotcha now.

AMOS: They are the finest people. I have one that lives across the street from me. He's the best friend I got. I would think that if he's at a negotiating table, he would be just like –

BARRETT: Like the others.

AMOS: Yeah. Very, very tough. And they do their homework. They have a staff. They are a very elite group.

BARRETT: Yeah. Yeah they - generally speaking, do they have better education than other organized groups?

AMOS: No. No. Well, when we were increasing the number of aircraft, our average pilot's education was 1 point — actually half a semester of a Master's Degree, We were only hiring people with 2 degrees. You know, we had 7,000 applicants and so we got the best that was available. So they are as educated and as degreed, except your World War II pilots. That's part of your management. I think if you took a managerial, educational level and took one of the pilots, it would be 00:47:00fairly comparable.

BARRETT: Um hmm, um hmm. Can you talk a little bit about the machinists as a group, and particularly the problems of negotiating and getting along with them?

AMOS: Well, they are somewhat of a different breed as it relates to the pilots. They're - our biggest problem has been the Miami base. We have about 6,000 -- probably a little more than that now -- IAM mechanics on the base. They are the -their work habits over years, long before Frank came to the company, long before I came to the company, were very poor. Now that's typical of any large –

[Break ]

BARRETT: Okay, we're back on.

AMOS: One of the problems that built up in Miami over a long period of time was the work ethics of the people on the base. I would say that, if we got 3.5 hours of work out of a mechanic on a base, we were lucky. And that has been sustained by outside consultants that come in. It's something that you know, once you spoil a child I don't think you ever recover and get them back to where you would like to have them. And I think that that's what happened. They were spoiled for a number of years. They had a tremendous amount, through contract negotiations long before I joined the company, long before Frank joined the company where we had full-time, non-working labor men on our payroll but not working on the base.

BARRETT: The labor relations thing. You were handling –

AMOS: Yeah. In other words, their job was to create problems because they had no work to do and we were not authorized to have them to work. So it's a matter of, you had 10-12 people on the Miami base who had nothing to do but to look for problems. And we had probably 3 labor relations people to try to handle 10 people that was out creating problems. And we did, through 2 or 3 negotiations we got that number down. But once an individual doesn't work all day I'm not sure he, when you put him back to work, he works. And the whole climate on the base has not been good. It's just not a productive base. I'm under the impression that that exists to a degree at all of the other airlines' major 00:50:00bases. Like TWA's got problems in their Kansas City base and equally all the rest of them. I'm not sure it was to the degree that we have. I'm sure it wasn't any worse. And it was my opinion they probably were a little better. And that wasn't from my own personal knowledge, it's from consultants that had been at the various --. We tried very, very hard and made some very good accomplishments. But based upon the requirements to try to get -- you know, we'd be very happy with 6 hours work. And I think it's true of any industry today, by the way. If you get over 6 hours work out of any employee that isn't on an automated machine, I think you're doing good. So, we were trying to get it up to 4.5 to 5 and we did, through negotiations eliminate some of those full-time 00:51:00people that didn't work. We did, through working with the union leadership, not the present union leadership, Charlie Bryan, but from Al Cates -- not Al Cates, I forget his first name, but anyway he was the leader for a while and was more reasonable to deal with. We did improve the efficiency. But it's very, very hard to change and they on the base, control the effectiveness of maintenance, the efficiency of maintenance, throughout the whole system because they can turn on and off spare parts that you need out of a system. And it's a technical type of a judgment. In other words, if some part is not - is broke the degree of work 00:52:00needed to repair it is a judgment of the mechanic. And it may only be 2 hours to repair it, but by his judgment, it's 10. And it's very hard, since he's going to sign off on the repair job to get him to do it in the 2 hours it probably takes and he plays with the part for 10 hours. So it isn't like watching some guy unload a bag.

BARRETT: OK. Quite a difference.

AMOS: So they can really control. And if you start putting too much pressure on them, like eliminating coffee breaks that we did one time, which is a waste of time and effort, cleanup time, numerous habits that they had within about a month you will see the results of that in that your inventory of parts available to the line is not as good as it used to be. And they'll do that during 00:53:00preparation for negotiations so that you really are you know, 3 months before the expiration of a contract, your floor spare parts is good. I think if you were going to start a new airline, you'd best sprinkle them around and pay the cost of transporting them to one place to assemble, rather than have as many people that control the whole input of your spare parts business. Now we have made some major accomplishments by moving a lot of our maintenance facilities to Atlanta. Now I'm not talking about line maintenance, which means fixing an airplane that came in. I'm talking about parts repairs. And we moved some parts 00:54:00repair to JFK and I think we sprinkled in a few other locations, but the mass of its still –

BARRETT: Is in Miami?

AMOS: Is in Miami. So we did make some headway in that. And records show that you get things out of Miami and you get 25-30% percent better efficiency on the same part you used to repair in Miami as compared to putting them in New York. And even New York's tough enough, but it's still better than Miami.

BARRETT: Than Miami?

AMOS: Miami, because of the mass and the habit.

BARRETT: It's hard to break that kind of thing.

AMOS: I don't think you ever break it totally. I think you live with it and you peck away at it and percentages. But once it's there, it continues to — the same with the airport. The Miami airport spills over — the inefficiency on the base spills over to the inefficiency at the terminal.

BARRETT: Oh, is that right then? The baggage handling faster handling?

AMOS: They see there what happens or they know what happens over there and cleaners are shoved back and forth. And maintenance definitely are shoved back and forth. Aircraft cleaners couldn't go from the base, cleaning aircraft over on the base and also cleaning over on the terminal, so they relate one to the other.

BARRETT: What about the flight attendants as a group and particularly dealing with them and their union?

AMOS: They - the flight attendants are a different breed altogether. They have an association with an aircraft and an airport, but have very little association with management because they are housewives, Number 1 and flight attendants, Number 2, now. Of course, we went through that. When I first joined the company, we wouldn't buy — they couldn't fly if they were married.

BARRETT: Oh, when you first joined, OK.

AMOS: And now they can fly and we raise their family for them. Because they take leave and it's a whole different ballgame which adds expense, no question. And their absenteeism upped once they get married and have a child because if the child's sick — it's never the child's sick, it's always the mother's sick. But they really do not get heavily involved, the masses, with the operation of the airline. They are more interested in what time do I have to be at the airport and how soon am I going to get back home. And they wave at their supervisor and don't spend the time and there's no — they have a whole different involvement with an airline. They're really not going to work with someone that they work 00:57:00with every day. They change on every plane. The plane will come into Atlanta and a crew of 6 will be together. And then they may end up, fly out of there and two of them will be on one airline with a whole new aircraft and so they really don't even get to know who they're flying with.

BARRETT: A great deal of mobility though.

AMOS: Oh yes. And they bid according to their husband's work schedule as to where they fly and when they fly. So they don't get involved or as involved, with what's going on with the company. They are, in my judgment, more company-oriented, even though maybe your union leaders may not be. Their bulk of their people are very much interested in the efficiency of the airline because 00:58:00they are going to deal with it when they get a load of passengers, if it's not running well. And so they are more interested in a good operation than any other group of persons because they are the ones that have them sitting there on the airplane waiting to take off. The second group is your agents here at the counter have to experience it, but their experience is more on a total cancellation, some on a delay. But the people sort of wait until they get on an airplane to take out their criticism, if they are 20 minutes late, on the flight attendants. So her work environment changes as it relates to the efficiency of the airline.

BARRETT: That's an interesting point because they've got the complainers, they —

AMOS: They are with them and they can't run off from them. They can't say, I'm going to get a supervisor. There isn't any on the aircraft.

BARRETT: They've got to deal with it, yes.

AMOS: They've got to deal with the problem. So they are a whole different — now their leadership has got, they're very tough to deal with. These flight attendants become very, very spoiled and their time-off in their schedules. And they are more interested in how many days they can get off and the leave time and that type of arrangements. So that they — because it's a secondary type of involvement really. We think it should be first but in reality, it's secondary. But generally your best group of performers, as far as when it's time to go to work, the flight attendants. Now, of course your pilots technically are always going to be sharp when it comes to getting in the cockpit. But they've got the 01:00:00door closed and it's a matter of technically flying the aircraft. The flight attendant has got to take more abuse and still keep smiling. And they do that very well. And when the day is over, they go home and forget all about Eastern Airlines because they may not have any involvement for 5 or 6 or 7 days before they come back again.

BARRETT: That is quite different, isn't it?

AMOS: This is different. That's a whole different thing.

BARRETT: Has it made much difference the number of men you now see as flight attendants? Everytime I fly, I'm impressed with seeing more of them.

AMOS: There's no question we've added a lot of men. I think it sort of adds to the crew. Even though the man is not going to be in charge and could be reporting, and generally is. Now that they are getting seniority, they can be 01:01:00the chief flight attendant. But I think there's a stabling force between a group of a couple men and 5 girls than there is 7 girls. I really think they've added to the total. I think it's a good move.

BARRETT: Has there been any change, for instance, in absenteeism — male, female?

AMOS: I think - I don't know if I've ever seen an official report, but I'm confident that you have less absenteeism with a male because there are so many things that can happen to cause a female not to report to work. Her husband is sick. Her mother gets sick and her child's sick. And a man generally, if his 01:02:00mother gets sick, his wife will go over and take care of her. And so there's just got to be more absentee problems. And, of course we went through that period of allowing them to fly after they were married was not the biggest problem, it was to allow them to fly and have children. Because we had to put in, and I think we came out with one of the — I think from practical experience - the best policy is to how long before they can take off for maternity leave. And actually their type of work by their doctors and our medical department happened to be under me, so I was involved heavily in trying 01:03:00to establish what the policy would be is that the first 3 months of pregnancy for a woman is the worst. And that's the period when we've got her flying. And so she's flying the period of time that probably is the worst as far as changing in altitude and the movement and stuff. But -

BARRETT: That's ironic, isn't it?

AMOS: Yeah. We let them now - we have the only way to win it was we have smocks or different uniforms for them to put on. We let them stay up until, I really don't recall, but I think it's maybe to the start of the seventh month. I'm not sure, it's in the policy. And then we ask them to get off. And that's never been a major problem because by that time the husband would like to have them off. So would her mother and so would everybody else. So when we first put it in, everybody, we didn't say they won't get off. There's nothing substantiated 01:04:00that says it's any worse after the eighth month. I think they're still enforcing it. I think it's still in. We had a lot of uproar when we put it in but not by the people that were 7 months, just the union officials and everybody saying it. But when it gets to the practical case, if your wife was flying after 7 months, you'd have some concerns.

BARRETT: Yes. I think that's true.

AMOS: And so it was a problem that didn't really exist except maybe in 1 or 2 cases. I think we're still implementing that program. And then we give them 3 months after and then we'll give them a leave time of 3 months. Now we don't pay that. But there is a certain period of that that is sick leave.

BARRETT: There is some?

AMOS: Some period, but a minor thing. Generally, they don't have enough sick leave to have it anyway. It's used up pretty well.

BARRETT: The placing of union representatives on the Board of Directors -- can you talk a little bit about that? How it came about? How you feel about it?

AMOS: Well, you gotta remember, it came about more from our history than our desire to do it. You're dealing with the employees and giving us money in '77, Give us money for 5 years. At the end of the 5 years, we still are having considerable problems because that was right in the heart of deregulation. And you want to remember that Frank and most of the senior management that were there during that period of time inherited a company that had a very poor fleet of aircraft and a very poor image of a company as a wheel club. And in order to 01:06:00increase the number of aircraft, as Frank did the employees don't relate to going out and buying all these new aircrafts. They related that if I don't have the money to buy a car, I don't want to buy -we shouldn't buy the car. Well, that's not a good comparison but that's the way they compare; that's the first question you get, you know. If we don't have the money, why are we buying an aircraft? And you can answer it a thousand times and never understand it that for the future of the airline and the future of the company, I should say, you got to order them. It isn't like the car. As long as the car takes you to work, it's not going to hurt you. But that's not the way to run an aircraft because you've got people choosing between an old aircraft and a new aircraft when 01:07:00they're getting on airplanes. Because there's just no question. And also fuel at that time, if you remember, was running against us, too. It was very, very high — going up. And the fuel -- you just could not operate with the type of aircraft that we had. But you could also answer that a thousand times at an employee and they'll never accept it. So it was that type of always being in a problem. And from '77 we begged them into a freeze. For 5 years we had them under the VEP. And before we ended the VEP, 6 months before, we started on the next program and which we got it — a year's delay in an increase. And before we got through with that, we were back to where that was going in and we were in negotiation. And that was probably the most critical period of time when 01:08:00probably the IAM - you're always better at hindsight. I've never yet, in my own mind, decided whether we should have taken the strike or not take the strike. And I really don't know if there is an answer to it. We didn't have a lot of money cause we had some specialists in. And I was in Washington, Frank was in Washington — not at the negotiation table, but where we could get hold of him. And we had already dispersed all of our employees and we had already said that there was just no way we can give this money. So I think that it was probably one of the crisis time of the company was — I don't remember the year truthfully. I could probably figure back. But it was when we were — the IAM at the table and they wanted and should have had 22% percent. That's how much, I think, they were making less than the other mechanics at the other airlines. So 01:09:00that says something to our successes to that point. But you can only keep doing that so long.

BARRETT: And the machinists were demanding that you give it back.

AMOS: Demanding and we couldn't get them to budge and we worked and worked and worked. And came down to the final hour and we had been saying, which is a typical strategy and the truth that we could not afford to give the 22% percent. We basically didn't have the money to give it. But when it came down to the strike deadline, a decision had to be made after 3 months of telling all of our employees, the non-contract employees and all the other union employees, that we 01:10:00just can't give 22% percent. We don't have it. Well, when we did give it, and I was at the table at that time, we told them, you know, we just can't take a strike but we can't give you the 22% percent. You're going to destroy the company. And in my opinion, we had to give the 22% percent. To this day, I don't think we'll ever explain it to the non-contract people that for 3 months we said we couldn't do it and we turned up and did it. And we had sent them to all the various locations ready to take over the IAM work. And they were heavily involved in it. We've done it before, but this seemed to be the critical period of time. And I think it was because they had been giving and giving and giving. But that I think the morale of our employees and the credibility of top management at that point in time probably suffered more than it has ever 01:11:00suffered. And I don't think that was a wrong decision, but I don't think it was a right decision to make. I don't think giving the 22% percent was a right one and it sure wasn't the right one to take a strike. Now if you thought you could have taken a strike and keep your credibility with all the employees and get them back to work in 3 days or 5 days, that wasn't going to happen either.

BARRETT: You couldn't predict a short strike?

AMOS: We couldn't predict a short - we definitely knew it wouldn't be short. There's no way it was going to be short.

BARRETT: As I understand it, as soon as that negotiation was concluded —

AMOS: We went right back, the next day. Three days later, I met with -- the union officials started to ask for money back. Because our statement was correct, we couldn't afford to do it, but we felt we'd be better going back and getting it with the airline running.

BARRETT: Than with the airline shutting down?

AMOS: Because I don't think we would have gotten a contract. I know we wouldn't have gotten a contract and we'd have been struck. So that was a tough, tough dark period. And we got - we didn't get the total amount back, but we got part back. My recollection didn't say how much, but we got it back. But it was on a borrowing-type of an arrangement and if there's anything we needed to do, it was not borrow money. That's the best we could go for.

BARRETT: Yeah. Yeah, that's right. You certainly had borrowed enough already. That was probably —

AMOS: And it was only during that period of time that the other airlines started to come forward and take money. Delta airlines, for example, which is always one we're compared with, they're still the highest paid airline. Have always been — about 8% percent. But they're not organized so they can pick it up in efficiency. When an airplane comes in here and has something wrong with it, they 01:13:00can move everybody that's in this facility out to help except pilots. You can take secretaries to go out and take tickets. You can take flight attendants to help take tickets and move them anyplace you want to move them. And that gives them the efficiency to catch up and keep the airplane and get it out quicker.

BARRETT: Whereas Eastern is not able to do that because of the labor agreement?

AMOS: Eastern nor any of the others. For example, we got one airplane that's due in here now and you've got a crew to unload it. And then 20 minutes later, another plane comes in and that same crew will unload it. Well, you put both of those airplanes on the ground at the same time, you've only got 1 crew to unload 2 airplanes. It's a simple example. Where, would that happen with Delta, they'll take their agents and have them to go out and unload that second airplane.

BARRETT: Oh okay. So they can handle it.

AMOS: The second airplane.

BARRETT: At the same time.

AMOS: And I don't think they'd want to do that often nor do they do it often, but it's available to them. And they can move the flight attendant out and let them take the tickets at the gate and move the agents down to help her.

BARRETT: It certainly makes a difference, doesn't it?

AMOS: Oh sure. And you know, depending on the size of the airport, if A, B, and C stations you have. At C stations you have no organized people. At B stations you have half organized and half not organized. You could put noncontract people helping on there to a certain extent, just a percentage and at A station you have total organized out on the ramp.

BARRETT: Do you have situations like that where 2 different stations should have –

AMOS: All B stations you have.

BARRETT: Oh okay. OK. OK.

AMOS: All B stations.

BARRETT: I had not realized that. OK. OK.

AMOS: Yea, you can mix them.

BARRETT: You can? OK. OK.

AMOS: Not maintenance-type work but ground handling work, yes.

BARRETT: OK. Did you have anything more to say about -- you were starting to lead into talking about putting union officials on the Board of Directors, I guess in connection with that negotiation where the machinists would not agree to the 22% percent.

AMOS: I think it's important that when you realize that the union officials have a hard time, even if they want to, to give us money. So you've got to put yourself in their situation. That's not their role to give money back to the company. It's just the reverse.

BARRETT: Yes. That's not why there were elected.

AMOS: No, and that's not going to help them get elected again. So it's just tough on them to give it back, even if they want to. But they have a 01:16:00responsibility for the success of the company but that's very hard to sell. But after you've been from a '77 freeze and then a 5-year program and then another give-back and then the strike period, you really had the union officials under the gun playing a reverse role and listening to a reverse role and their employees getting stuff from us all the time that we're going broke. At some point in time, the employees wonder if they've got the right management. At some point in time, we ought to give enough to get -- management ought to be able to get this thing straightened out. But they don't realize all of the elements that 01:17:00go to make keeping an airline afloat. And another think I want to keep emphasizing is that when they see new airplanes coming in during a period of time, they just don't relate it. I don't care how you say it, it's just not there.

BARRETT: — as you said to their family budget.

AMOS: And so from that type of trying to convince the union leaders and then trying to get enough data to the employees that we need the money, it was through that cycle that a decision was made to put them on the board. I would think that probably it was the right decision but I have to say that I'm not 01:18:00sure I'd ever made it because I think it's just not compatible. And a lot of it depends on who the union leadership is. Unfortunately, the leadership that we have in the IAM, I don't care what you do for him, you're not going to change him. And putting him on the board just makes him stronger to deal with because he's such a big named union leader for his people. And we have one of the toughest in Charlie Bryan, individuals. He grew up in Atlanta. He just is - he's John L. Lewis back in those periods of times and that's about the best we can 01:19:00give him. He's just very, very strong. If you want to spend an evening with him and not talk labor, he'd be the finest guy. But his philosophy, he really believes that union people should work although he's not willing to change the work rules to let them work. Management should do that. And he really believes that we should get, I think 8 hours work out of a mechanic, 6 hours work, at least. I think he really does but that's not his problem, that's management's problem.

BARRETT: Oh OK. OK. OK. I see.

AMOS: And I hated to see him go on the board. I don't think they had any effect as far as running the company. It's the image that they have back with the employees. And it puts them really ahead of the manager they work for, the 01:20:00officers they work for, he's not on the board. So there's a whole relationship problem that's not natural. There's a better way of saying that. I don't know whether it has a great effect on what happens to the airline. I'm sure it doesn't from a policy standpoint. But you're better off without it. You've got apples and oranges.

BARRETT: Was there as much effect, you think, in having the representatives on there? I guess in your earlier who in a way represented the pilots and the non-contract employees, those 2 board members?

AMOS: Would it have?

BARRETT: Did that make as much difference as having machinists on there?

AMOS: Well, I'm under the impression that the pilots do not have a union member on the board.

BARRETT: You're right. There is not a union member.

AMOS: No, but they have a representative.

BARRETT: Yes.

AMOS: But he's a businessman. So that's quite a difference.

BARRETT: OK. OK.

AMOS: And I think the pilots are smart enough to know that you can't wear 2 hats. And so they went out and got a hat to sit there for them, rather than to put someone under the gun. So I think the approach that they took and that non-management took is effective particularly if you're a union leader, than it would be to have the flight attendant and the IAM as an actual representative. I think you've got those 2 people wearing 2 different hats and it's an impossibility. So I think if you do it, you should do it the way the pilots and the non-contract, if you have to do it at all.

BARRETT: You mentioned earlier having the noncontract employees vote on the freeze back in '77.

AMOS: They voted on everything that related to wages since we've ever taken from them.

BARRETT: That's really an innovative thing.

AMOS: Yeah. It's the first time. And I'm very — I think I'm stronger for that than Frank was. But he wouldn't have had to fought with the union, the non-contract. And I sure wouldn't. I still think it was - I hope they're still doing it. I don't think they should ever stop doing it. Now you're always going to get to vote, in my opinion and boy, it's awful nice when you say you can vote for it.

BARRETT: Rather than having it imposed on you.

AMOS: Oh, I wouldn't ever support that.

BARRETT: How did you actually arrange that? Did you allow them to choose?

AMOS: Oh, we just put a card out. We sent them a letter just like the union does. It says here's what we're going to do. It's just like a contract. And said here's what you're voting for and here's what the cost will be and here's the whole program and you check if you're in favor or not in favor. And it was 01:23:00sealed and we selected each time a group of employees to count the ballots. We'd get so many from - we may have a representative from Greensboro and we'd have someone in the management ranks and someone in the secretarial ranks and agent ranks and all the different occupations. We'd get about 12 of them together and they would elect a chairman. And the votes would go into a box at the Post Office. That committee had a key to the box and go pick up the votes and count them.

BARRETT: That was very much above board —

AMOS: We in management stayed totally out of it. Now we had 1 management person representing management.

BARRETT: On the committee.

AMOS: On the committee, but we didn't - he was no more than any other representative. And it's still done that way.

BARRETT: That's real employee involvement, isn't it?

AMOS: Yeah. And to me that's the way it ought to be. That's between management.

BARRETT: You talked a little bit about the employee involvement thing. As I understand, some of the help for that, advice came from Boeing.

AMOS: Well, we got - yeah. It did. But it came about in a different situation. Boeing had this employee involvement. But they basically put it in - if I - through their management. We put it in through our management with the help of an outside consulting firm. And Boeing really put most of their management people through the program, or got them indoctrinated into the program, before they implemented the program. We educated various levels prior to — at the same time. And that's I guess it's successful. I am not knowledgeable as to 01:25:00the success of it. Now, my information tells me that it's fairly dead right now. But I don't know that from hands on. Also Boeing, if you recall, put their program in after having 30 thousand people on layoff. Now it's damn easy to put a program when you got that many layoff. Rather than a period of time where you're just struggling for survival in a new environment of management with deregulation and buy new aircraft.

BARRETT: Yeah that's crazy.

AMOS: And what they did is, when they went into making the 727, they put a 727 01:26:00program together where it was a team, and I am building a new product. Now, you can build a lot of enthusiasm between you and I if we're building that lamp together and you're going to see it sell. But by God, it's tough to build that type of enthusiasm when you put a bag on an airplane here and it goes to Atlanta and you never get to see your finished product sold. My philosophy is that Boeing had it ripe because of their employment position that they were in. They put in a new 727 and they put all employees and that's all they did was work on 727. And they put them on teams and they put the seats in and the next team would put the — and it was like a family affair of building your own car. And when that thing rolled off the line, it was like the Statue of Liberty being 01:27:00unveiled here. And then the next plane came along and it would have an Eastern tail and the other one had another airline. Now that you can build unity in. And so, yes, they had an employee involvement but you've got to study the difference between what we were under and what they had in their hands. And I think, had we been making lamps and had a big lay-off to where we weren't making lamps and then came back and put in a whole new structure, I think we could have pulled it off. We didn't have that opportunity.

BARRETT: Um hmm. It certainly makes sense. It makes sense.

AMOS: 'Cause you've always got the problem, when the plane's delayed in Atlanta and it gets so it makes their work 3 times as hard. So it's very hard to get them enthused about Atlanta.

BARRETT: Atlanta just sends them problems —

AMOS: Just like another company if it's causing them a problem here. So it's a - I think under the environment we did fairly well with the new programs. I don't think anyone, any airline has done as well as far as give-back programs. But see I think you can only do it so long.

BARRETT: I interviewed — I won't be able to say his name now - the fellow in human resources who handles the wage plans. I can't say his name now. But anyway, he was explaining to me about how complex it is. It's extremely complex. Not only did you have so many different kinds of employees and you had 3 different labor agreements at least, you had variable earnings, you had these 01:29:00give-backs, you had what they call salary of record. It is an overwhelmingly complex –

AMOS: No one really understands. When we went into all these programs - see we, either by experience or by education, were taught how to run a compensation program. I didn't have any courses of how you take it away, how do you give part of it back and how do you pro-rate it and how do you deal a dollar increase to a profit of a 40 thousand company. It's very, very complex. And we started, we would just spend months trying to get that thing so we understood it and then you got to go back and talk to the finance people in the computers and make it work there. I don't think it would ever work if you didn't have computers. I don't know how in the world you would ever figure it out. I really don't. It's 01:30:00as large as we were. Various locations and the pay structure is so different - you know, overtime, no overtime, pilots, expense accounts, no flying time and hotel rooms and that type thing. Very, very complicated. But we were fortunate during that period of time to have some very good compensation people who have gone on to greater things, but they could cut their teeth on that.

BARRETT: Evans was the fellow whose name I was trying to think of.

AMOS: Evans is — he wasn't in compensation. He's in compensation now. He was in the corporate policy area when he worked for me, when I left. He's a very bright guy. He's not, he's not a comp man.

BARRETT: Who was in compensation before him that got involved in some of that stuff?

AMOS: We had George McDonald, who I stole from Johnson & Johnson, who is really a comp man and only a comp man, by the way. He came. And then I hired 2 people, fortunately. One from Johnson & Johnson, a very bright guy, Bob Nash and Hank Logger. And they were trained by George McDonald who is really a top, top comp man. He is in charge, was then and went back after about 5 years. He went back to Johnson & Johnson. And he is their, again their top comp man from all the various companies that they have and they have a lot of different companies. And they are very decentralized. In other words, they have a dental department that anything to do with teeth, the wires and all the things that do with teeth, 01:32:00that's a division. But it's not a division like we would run. It's a separate corporation. That general manager, if he was to go buy a wire plant for the dental, he could go buy it. He'd better be successful. So George is - went back to them. We got a lot of — and then I had — comp is my strength in personnel. So between the 2 of us and then we trained 2 very good men who later become, each of them, directors. Now one of them went back to Johnson. George stole him from me. Hank Logger went back there and he's still with them doing an outstanding job. Very bright guy. And Nash was an excellent guy, too. And then we had John Heenan, who is equally as good and trained by those guys. I don't know, they do not have a Director of Compensation today. They have the Vice 01:33:00President of Personnel who has about 4 people from compensation reporting to him. So he's really the brains of the - because I know all the people down there and they're not total comp people.

BARRETT: No?

AMOS: He is. I don't know him very well but I have nothing, but heard good word about.

BARRETT: Who do you mean?

AMOS: The Vice President of Personnel, it's called. His name is Shreever or Seevers, Seevers. But he's a good comp man now and I think he is the fellow that pulls it all together.

BARRETT: Oh yeah. Yeah.

AMOS: Just different style. I hear he's very capable. I only met him one time.

BARRETT: Has the structure changed after you left or when you were leaving in the human resources? Now they call it human resources.

AMOS: Yes, yes because intentionally we went out and hired and I found him. In fact, it was part of the hiring process of Johnson, who is now –

BARRETT: Jess Johnson, oh yeah.

AMOS: He's strictly labor. Loves labor and does a good job of it. A good man overall. Not a personnel man at all. Doesn't want to be. Never will be because he spends all his time at labor. And we knew that when we hired him because he had had compensation under him at the rubber company where we stole him from. And you could interview him on personnel and he didn't have the depth there, but he had all you wanted in the labor area. Good man. And he then shifted, see. And I think that's probably good. I had labor under me, but my strength was 01:35:00personnel. His strength is labor with very little personnel. So we're just opposites, which I think has some plusses. So the personnel, you'll always find that the senior officer, if he's labor, will strengthen labor and weaken personnel, and if he's personnel, his strength is personnel and weak in labor. And I strengthened personnel and probably to a degree weakened labor. And now I know that they have the personnel managers reporting to labor and I would never do that if I was there. Never would you have me – 'cause they are 2 breeds, 2 breeds. A good labor guy is not a good personnel guy because he goes by contracts rather than people. He works with paper all day.

[Break ]

BARRETT: Okay, we're back on.

AMOS: So, I would not be able to operate efficiently under this present system. 01:36:00And I'm not saying it's wrong. It's right for Johnson, it's wrong for me because I think a flight attendant — not a flight attendant, I'm sorry - an agent would not like to have the person she's talking to report to labor relations. And that's what you've got now. Just to me basically wrong. To me it doesn't mean it's wrong, but I would never have it. I wouldn't want to be an agent talking to a labor man because I might as well join the union. 'Cause he understands, labor man understands contracts. That's his whole work. Are you right or are you wrong?

BARRETT: Whereas on the other side it's the general policies, the practices and the people.

AMOS: Yeah.

BARRETT: One other thing I noticed about the organization is that employee communication, I think it's called, is in the corporate communications function.

AMOS: We did that for several reasons. We put that together. First of all, we were trying to hire a top-flight individual and it's very hard to hire an individual in today's environment when he has only external communications is a better way to put it. And we hired, I think, a very good — he's since left the company. But we hired –

BARRETT: Is that McGraw?

AMOS: McGraw.

BARRETT: OK.

AMOS: I was, we found him actually, because he worked for a member of the board who was on our board. He is not on our board now, I don't think. And he 01:38:00happened to be on the committee of the board that I was a secretary to. It's the Compensation of Stock Option Committee of the board. And I was just a secretary that would bring — because all officer increases, all of your comp programs after approved by Frank, are taken to the Board, to this committee and it's run by a very capable guy, Elkins, who's been on the board a long time. And he, and when you go out to get a public relations guy, they are very hard to get — a good public relations guy because they tend to think walking, and speaking and not sitting and planning. They're bull-shitters from the first word. And that's part of their trade. We weren't really looking for that; we were looking for a manager who could come in and change our image with the press. And you're not 01:39:00going to do that solely with the bullshit. He's going to have to study facts, present facts, and go down and talk to the papers with facts and not through a drink and a cocktail, which is generally their style. So we were looking for a different type of a guy to report to Frank. And we were very fortunate to get McGraw, who I think was a very good man. And we got him because of Borman. He wanted to come and stay for 5 or 6 years and with Borman's name, he was going to get a lot of press coverage, irrespective of the company. So that's a lot better than working for John Smith over there who never is interviewed and his name never appears. Because everytime Borman's name would appear, so would McGraw's. So having Borman there was an excellent recruiting tool because I imagine 01:40:00McGraw's name is well known as a public relations guy. And we wanted more than public relations, and we needed more than public relations. We needed a total corporate image so that we could - what we were telling the employees, we were telling the press. And if you have them in 2 different departments, you have that communications problem. And I've always thought that if you put it - employee communications, as large as we are, we're all over the United States and you put it in personnel, you'd never get a strong guy to run it or wherever you put it because it's secondary to compensation; it's secondary to labor relations. It's secondary, and you put it in and you can go out and get a good 01:41:00PR guy who wants to be a manager and not only a drinker. Then we put it all together before he came. And we put — called it corporate communications, which means all communications goes through him. And he came aboard with the idea of changing our image as relations to the Herald, particularly, because we were not doing very well.

BARRETT: The Miami —

AMOS: Miami Herald. And I think he did that, I think we were much more successful, externally. There's no question we were more effective internally because we used to do most of the communications to the people through Bob Evans who had the personnel. And we tend to write policy-way and we should have been 01:42:00writing employee-way. You know, there is a difference. One, two, three is policy. And you've got to have a little finesse so you can get that. So we took it out of personnel before he came, which I was very much in favor of. And we organized a new function and changed the title to corporate communications. And we took The Falcon, which was internal communications and put it there.

BARRETT: It had been in personnel as well, or human resources?

AMOS: No, it was not in personnel. It was under - who did Bryan report to? I don't really know. I guess he reported to the previous. We upgraded the job from a Vice President to a Senior Vice President and asked the other officer to leave. And I don't think he paid any attention to it, but I guess it was under 01:43:00him. I'm not sure. I'm not positive.

BARRETT: But it wasn't in communication before that?

AMOS: Was not total communications and what was said to the press had no implication of what was said in The Falcon. If it was, it was happenstance. So we brought him in and let him hire a Director of Internal Communications, which he brought his own man in. And raised the value of The Falcon, enlarged it to have ads so we could get bigger communication. And it became a much, much better. We also changed - and this function was in my unit. We had consumer affairs, it was called, which was took care of passenger complaints written. All letters going to Borman, which are enormous are answered by that unit. And also 01:44:00any cargo damage or anything relating to your cargo was put together under one person who reported to me. As soon as Dick got his feet wet, but it was pre-planned because I told him before he was hired that events was going to come to you because that's external communications,

BARRETT: That is.

AMOS: That's total writing to people that's lost a bag. And so we moved that under him. So that anything written, whether it's internal or external, is written by the same department. And you get more professionalism because the top man, that's his business. And you get a much better - and it was an excellent move. But to do that, you have to raise the stature of the unit. And that stature probably helped them to get the replacement for Dick McGraw, who came I 01:45:00did not know. I had never met. But he came from TWA.

BARRETT: Yes, I think that's right.

AMOS: And he's equally I guess, competent as Dick is.

BARRETT: I had heard that at one point in The Falcon's history, that it never made any reference to organized groups or to the union. Had you ever heard that?

AMOS: Uh, uh. I don't think we talked about the contract in the detail that they talk now. But I don't think that was because of a philosophy change. I think it was a lack of skill in the level that we had running The Falcon. Internal 01:46:00communications now is a director level. When we had The Falcon as a Falcon, it was about 3 levels below the lowest level of management. So you're not going to get the same product, nor are you going to be as competent. Your labor relations is not going to lay all this out and with external communications, they have to be involved because the press is going to force them to become knowledgeable so you can translate that knowledge to the press at the same time you can transfer accurately to the employees. And that's the plus of having a higher grade of communications.

BARRETT: OK. That makes good sense.

AMOS: I don't think it was a philosophy change from Frank, myself or anybody else. We just didn't have the capability to write it the way it ought to be written.

BARRETT: OK. There was a period — I'm not sure if this was after you left or 01:47:00before - that Frank was both the CEO and the President. And then he quit doing the presidency thing and that was filled. Was that - I just lost the timing of that. Had you left already by then?

AMOS: Well, you're talking about when Joe Leonard became President?

BARRETT: Yes.

AMOS: That happened after I came, after I left I'm sorry. Joe Leonard came in and I recruited him 3 months before I signed out. I spent my whole time recruiting Joe Leonard, finding a Joe Leonard. And it was one of the reasons –

BARRETT: I'm sorry. You were looking for him not for the presidency but –

AMOS: No. What I was looking for - and Frank was aware of this - I was looking for someone well qualified to run a maintenance unit, but with the potential to 01:48:00compete with other senior officers. Because you know, we are a technical business. Equally as important, we are a service unit. So we didn't, in any sense of the word, we weren't out looking for the President of the company, but we were looking for someone that would compete with the other senior officers. Knowing that, in my judgment, I'm not sure Frank totally agreed - we didn't have in-house a President. He wouldn't agree with that but everybody has their own opinion. And not because they weren't totally qualified. But unless you have someone who's been there 6 or 7 years as a senior officer and gone through what we've gone through, sure as hell has got a credibility problem as do all top 01:49:00management with the employees to why in hell we turned the company around. So I think if you're recruiting one of the capable individuals, like a Russ Ray or a Morter, like who are probably the two that would be the most - both have since left, of course. I think if you were recruiting them off the field and you didn't all of their, know so much about them they could probably come in and be President. And they're probably brighter and equally as qualified as Joe Leonard, but it's very hard to transition 6 or 7 years of problems.

BARRETT: Oh OK. You sort of get stained by the process.

AMOS: We did not hire Leonard thinking that he was going to go ahead of Erlich 01:50:00or a Russ Ray, but that he would at least compete. But so we, and one of the reasons we went after Joe Leonard is that we wanted someone from Northwest, if at all possible, because anytime you bring a new philosophy of maintenance into your company, it changes how you schedule an airplane in for a face-check and all these things. And we had had an excellent guy that -- unfortunately, he had cancer when we hired him. He had been the top man at Northwest maintenance and they've got a good maintenance department. And he was excellent. Bill -- isn't that awful, he's passed away now. Talked to his wife. Three months ago she called me. I'll think of it. But anyway he was the top dog for a long period of time.

BARRETT: At Northwest?

AMOS: At Northwest. And Northwest is a real tough-run airline due to their past President who is no longer there. And at the period of time when they had to select a new man, the finance man got the job rather than Bill. And so then he became available and he went over to Braniff. So we actually stole Bill from Braniff and he had had one cancer in the small of his back. So we brought him on a short-range deal because we needed someone right away. And he's a good man. He made a good contribution for us, but he didn't last but about 3 years. He finally got a tumor on the brain. So we went out looking for the best man that was available to us. But that was during the period of time when we were fighting for existence. It was very hard to get someone to believe a prosperous airline, if any are prosperous. But I ran in and found Joe who I was very 01:52:00impressed with. He had been with Northwest for 16, 15 or 16 years under Bill. So he had had the same philosophy. And he had moved to American Airlines and had 2 promotions at American in 2.5 years. So he was a shining light there and had done very well with American Airlines. And the only reason we got him is that we were going to make him a Senior Vice President of Maintenance now and he had enough confidence in himself that even if Eastern Airlines failed, hell he could get another job. So we stole him from American Airlines, although we stole him not because of what he did at American Airlines, but what he knew about 01:53:00Northwest. And he has good potential so there's no question that he was going to go further at some point in time. It's unfortunate, I think - that we had - that the decision for a presidency had to come before we got everything we ought to get out of him in the maintenance. It would have been better if it had come 3 or 4 years later, in my opinion. But you know, those things you have to make decisions. So he did get the presidency. I was not surprised. Everybody else was surprised. I was not surprised because I had spent a lot of time with him, interviewing him and talking to him, trying to convince him to come. And Frank was very impressed with him, too. He's very capable. We just moved him a little fast, in my opinion. But you have to do that. He'll go faster with it.

BARRETT: He's actually rather low-keyed.

AMOS: Very low key. He's not, and never will be, your typical Senior President. But you want to remember, no maintenance man would be. They're used to talking to figures and machines and not people.

BARRETT: Than people, yes. That's a good point.

AMOS: See, you got to remember, Frank's an engineer, but he's got that charisma. He's equally as good as the salesman, if not better. He's technically strong? We've never tested him on it. But at a meeting, he sure as hell knows what the answer is. If you talk something technically, what's wrong with an airplane? He'll say that's not a good answer; that doesn't work. And generally he's right.

BARRETT: He knows what he's talking about.

AMOS: Yea. He's technically very — he's got a mind that never forgets. He doesn't know how gifted he is, truthfully. He's a very gifted individual, intellectually. He can remember if you tell him — we could be sitting there 01:55:00shooting the breeze and if I told him something, 5 years later he'd remember it. And it could have been as important as have another cup of coffee through the whole picture.

BARRETT: Yes. That's quite amazing.

AMOS: But he's got a retention. And people with his intellect have it.

BARRETT: Was it a good idea for him to move away from directing the operation of the company?

AMOS: We'd been through too many — first of all, we'd been through too many crises of which whoever's fault it is or whether its — he has to take the blame. And the outside world, the press, has not been fair to him, in my opinion, at all. And I think it's because of his name. And I think they write about Eastern because of Borman's name. They read about it. He's still a name on the Today Show. Last week some reference was made — you know Scott? Do you 01:56:00ever watch the Today Show?

BARRETT: Yes, once in a while.

AMOS: He says, I don't know whether my job is better or worse than Frank Borman's. So that says that –

BARRETT: He wouldn't have picked another airline to make that reference to, would he?

AMOS: Wouldn't even know who they are. I think if you went to him and said he was the presidency of the chief executive - I don't think he'd know. Honest, I don't think he would. And neither would the audience.

BARRETT: That's right. That's right.

AMOS: So whenever you have that much visibility, people want to write about it because they can go write about Northwest. I don't even know who the President that's in there. Don't know his name. The finance guy is retired that I was referring to. So I really don't know his name. So if you were a reporter looking for something to write about the newspaper - an airline you wouldn't go to 01:57:00Northwest. So if you have to have so many articles on airlines, you'd go to Eastern. And unfortunately, Eastern's posture has not been very good. So you can't write success. And so because of Borman's name and the attention that it would bring, I think he's getting an unfair shake in the press, in the number of articles and the tone of the articles, as compared to the other airlines. American Airlines — Crandall is a young guy that used to be in marketing. Outstanding man, by the way. Very creative and very much of a planner. A good man. Hell, they don't write about him at all. He's probably - as far as success, if there is success in an airline, he should be on the front page of a lot of articles. But hell, no one knows his name. Same way with United. They pulled off 01:58:00this coup of buying the Pacific away from Pan Am. And Ferris, Dick Ferris' name is mentioned but it doesn't have the readability and instead of page, instead of a first page. And the same way at Pan Am. They sold half of their airline. Not half, but they sold their only division that was making money. Well, if Frank were ever to make a decision like that, it would have been front page USA. You know, with pictures and —

BARRETT: It's true.

AMOS: It's just the way the world is and it's unfortunate that he's going. And then the Texas Air deal.

BARRETT: Did that surprise you when it was sold?

AMOS: No. It surprised me it was Texas Air, but knowing the financial conditions of the company and knowing Charlie Bryan and knowing that he wasn't going to 01:59:00give in under any condition, I didn't think so. And I told my wife, because there's just no way they are going to get him to give in. Because he has 2 years of contract. He didn't even have to talk to you. See, that's quite different than the other groups.

BARRETT: Yes, the other groups were in negotiation right then.

AMOS: So this guy can tell you to go to hell for 2 years and he didn't even have to show up at the meeting. And if you knew him —

BARRETT: You'd expect that's what he would do.

AMOS: Oh, I have there's no question in my mind he wasn't going to do it. He's just not that —

BARRETT: Do you think he's influenced very much by Randy Barber?

AMOS: Yeah, to a fault. Randy Barber's very, very bright and understands figures and understands but his philosophy I'm not sure Randy Barber agrees with America's philosophy of running a business. If you ever spend any time and I have not spent a lot of time, I've just listened to him over the table. He 02:00:00really doesn't, I don't think he believes in the free enterprise or the way our structure is made. I don't think he agrees that running a company of 40,000 people is worth any more than some analyst, you know. It's a funny philosophy he has. And Bryan, his strength is only in his philosophy. He's no dumbbell, I don't mean that. I think the worst thing that ever happened is when — and you know he, Randy Barber's record if you go back and check where he came from and his history, it's not a firm you'd go looking for. The philosophy of the firm, I don't know it but it's a — he's got a lot of philosophy. You listen to someone from Price Waterhouse, not Price Waterhouse, well could be Price 02:01:00Waterhouse from Merrill Lynch talk about the finances and what it takes and listen to him. It's like Russia. It's just not, its –

BARRETT: Not singing the same music, huh?

AMOS: It's a different philosophy of what businesses ought to do and what managers ought to do and how you ought to run it. And he has an awful lot of influence on Bryan. Bryan is a mechanic and very stubborn. Very bright, bright from the standpoint of his narrow experience there. But very, very — he never changes. He never in the history of Eastern Airlines gives in totally. He always got to have something back. Never. We knew when he was elected that it was going 02:02:00to be hell because he just never gives in. He gives in. We've got things from him but we'd have to give it over here. We'd publicize what we were after. We have not publicized when they have had to give –

BARRETT: To get that?

AMOS: To get that. It's not equal. We came out way ahead but not where we wanted to be. Because you just don't do it. You're just not going to get - and then there's been - he has been very jealous of Frank's publicity. And a lot of his comments and lining up news broadcasts has been to react to the publicity that Frank was getting. He thought that Frank was out trying to seek publicity and 02:03:00Frank wasn't. He's had more than he wants. But that affected Bryan and he goes out and tries every way in the world to get on a camera. Sets up news broadcasts, which is never heard of. I don't know of any labor leader at his level that can call news conferences and get much turnout. But the reason he does is he's going to talk about Borman and that's readable. Not, Charlie Bryan is not readable and he uses that to his advantage.

BARRETT: The press really has played into that a good deal.

AMOS: Oh and he plays it.

BARRETT: The personality conflict, whatever you want to –

AMOS: And then when he -- and he does things to get attention. Now he said if 02:04:00you don't sell to Texas Air, I'll take a 15% percent cut. Why he was no more going to give a 15% percent cut. Proves he isn't - hasn't given it yet, if Borman leaves. That's bullshit. That's Charlie Bryan.

BARRETT: There really wasn't any way that the board could accept a proposal like that, is there?

AMOS: Oh, they shouldn't never. They would never accept it and I don't know of any board that would accept it. You know, you would have destroyed the company and you would have destroyed Frank Borman who has kept the company together. No board would ever do that, whether they were Borman's board or no one's going? The minute they do that they might as well — you've changed the whole philosophy of who runs the company. You know 15% percent is not worth it to ruin that company and taking Frank Borman out. That wasn't even — that was Charlie 02:05:00knew that. Hell, he's smart enough to know. Atlee sits on the board. He knows what the board thinks of Borman. You can't sit through a board meeting, which I did for years -- not a member of the board, but as a visitor. You know how strong he is with the board. So no stupe would say here's 15% percent for Frank Borman.

BARRETT: You knew it couldn't have been accepted.

AMOS: Why he had — first of all, he knew it — if he thought it would have been, he wouldn't have made it. No, he was just after Borman. Not after him from - really after him, I guess is correct. It's unfortunate but he used it as a — and he did that because Frank rightfully had to admit that it was Charlie Bryan that caused Eastern Airlines to be sold to Texas Air. Now that's a true statement. And if Frank was asked that question, he had to answer it truthfully 02:06:00and he answered it truthfully. I mean, he couldn't say no or we wouldn't, he had a choice. Either Charlie would have to get 20% percent or 22% percent from Charlie Bryan or sell to Texas Air or we had the banker problem.

BARRETT: Yeah. I gather those were really the choices before them, weren't they?

AMOS: It's just that simple. So if he had asked a question, why did you sell to Texas Air? Because we couldn't get Charlie Bryan to come to the table. And the lenders had said you must have all 3 or - so he didn't do it to be mean. He's not out to match Charlie Bryan in the press. He's already there. That's immaterial, but he had to answer the question, unfortunately. But I think Texas 02:07:00Air is a good move.

BARRETT: Do you think it will be good, ultimately?

AMOS: Yeah. I don't know how without something like that. I think we've run the course. I hate to say this, but we've run the course in trying to take and get more from our employees and have the bankers so involved. They're still going to be involved with Frank Lorenzo because he now has a $2.5 billion debt instead of $1 billion. He's got a tough challenge. But he's got a lot of options, in my opinion that Frank didn't have. I mean, he's got Continental and he's got Texas — Texas Air is nothing. I mean they only have a little service group, 02:08:00basically. He's since bought a small airline out West. I guess a commuter airline.

BARRETT: Oh, I hadn't heard that.

AMOS: Yeah, I think so. He has lost his President, though. I don't know him.

BARRETT: But you think ultimately that would be looked back on as a good move by Eastern and they'll stay together as a corporation?

AMOS: Yes, if you're saying, would I want to do it, then I'd say no. Been 20 years at Eastern. I'd like for it to be Eastern period, and not Eastern as a part of Texas, or one of the upstarts. But when you look, you forget your own pride and from a pure business standpoint. And knowing Charlie Bryan and knowing how long we've been fighting with the unions, I think Lorenzo has strength that 02:09:00Frank doesn't have. Like he sold off all the spots for — not all — he sold, I think, 37. I'm only reading newspaper stuff. He got $66 or $68 million for selling some slots at LaGuardia and Washington and Boston. He didn't have to sell slots in Boston. It's open. There's only 2 airlines in the United States, I think, where the slots are restricted and that's those 2 airlines. And Eastern and Texas — New York Air — has a large percentage of those slots because they both run shuttles competitively together. But he could have sold the Texas, the New York Air slots, but that's going to give him leverage, I think, off the record, too. Because he can also take our slots and give them to Texas Air. 02:10:00[Inaudible ] And he can put some leverage by transferring aircraft.

BARRETT: Well, it will be interesting. That will be —

AMOS: And Continental. He's got that other — gives us a Western tie-in. It's fairly strong. A good airline. He did a fine job with that.

BARRETT: Recovering there.

AMOS: And that gives him you know a step forward with the bankers and everything else. If you can do it once, maybe you can do it twice.

BARRETT: What do you think - what did Bill Usery do in all this, during the time he was at Eastern — working with Eastern?

AMOS: I met Bill for breakfast shortly, I think before it was officially announced that he was coming to work for us. Because out of common courtesy to 02:11:00me, Frank would do that because he was coming in to work in the area that I had responsibility for. So he and I met at the Marriott Hotel and had breakfast together. He's a very, very capable negotiator. He's strong. He wouldn't have been Secretary of Labor without it. He brings to it a name, experience — not that — far beyond what I had and far beyond what Johnson had. And so I think it was a good move. It has more plusses than minuses. Anytime you bring a consultant in to take over the lead role that he took over, you weaken the man that's there running the function.

BARRETT: Oh, yes.

AMOS: Now, I'm not saying Jack Johnson is not equally as capable as he was before Usery came in, but he'll never be perceived that good because you don't carry someone's briefcase when the crises are on. You're better off being the top spokesman. And you're not going to compete with the former Secretary of Labor. That's like same comparison. Johnson can't compete with Usery, nor would he want to. And that wasn't the idea and he didn't want to. But I'm saying press-wise, employee-wise. It's like Charlie Bryan trying to compete with Borman. It's stupidity. So I don't think without Bill we would have got that through.

BARRETT: You mean some of the agreements that were reached following his arrival there?

AMOS: Yeah. I don't think we would have because I think he's damn good. That's his life and he did well. And he had the full support from Borman which was a plus. Most consultants don't have that type of credibility with - you know that.

BARRETT: Yea, that's true. That's certainly true,

AMOS: So Bill's very lucky that he and Borman hit it off so well. But he's been, they would not have made it without him, in my judgment. So it has to be good. I think in the long run, it hurts your own local labor relations, I think you'd agree to that.

BARRETT: Uh, huh. Wouldn't it have been better than if Usery had been a part of the organization rather than a consultant — brought in as?

AMOS: Yes, but I don't think he'd take that job. Yes. If we could have hired him to run labor relations and taken it away from personnel — separate the 2 units 02:14:00— oh hell that would have been excellent. But it would have been much, much better. But Bill Usery is not going to give up his business and get messed up in that on a full-time business. So I don't think that was a choice. But I'm sure Frank pursued that. If he didn't - he's smarter than that. I'm sure he pursued it. But you're not going to hire the former Secretary of Labor to be a Senior Vice President of Labor Relations. And it's foolish. But I'm not sure that he could have been as successful with it, by the way because he'd been in the management structure. And as a consultant, people visualize that he has more decision-making and more influence on Frank because he doesn't report to Frank. 02:15:00But there's no difference, actually, because if Frank don't want him, he'd tell him to go tomorrow. But they don't see it that way. They see him as being an independent negotiator and he isn't. He works for Frank Borman and gets his meals through Frank Borman. He can cut off Bill Usery as quick as he could cut off Marv Amos or Johnson or anything else. That's not a good rationale, but the press and the people don't visualize it that way.

BARRETT: That's the way they would perceive it, then. That's a good point, yeah.

AMOS: But hell, if you could have hired him, he should have been hired, and he would have been hired. I'm sure Frank would have put him in — I don't know if he would have been as effective because the union or the normal people feel that 02:16:00reporting to someone is stronger than being a consultant. I mean, your chances of getting it through Borman or through any executive, is less if you report to him than if you are a consultant. And, in my opinion, I think I had more influence on Frank over the period of time and we had a lot of consultants in — than any of the consultants. But I don't think this isn't — those were crisis-type decisions. And I think, generally speaking, a consultant comes in to give the individual that's in charge of the function new thinking, new approaches, his experience. But I don't think generally a good executive immediately downgrades what he's been living with in any function. He's going to 02:17:00put them both together because that consultant -- one good thing about being a consultant, whether it's right or wrong, you're gone. And you've already got your money.

BARRETT: In other words, the officer of the company has to stay with it. He needs to stay.

AMOS: And for Frank to take the advice of a consultant against - and I don't think that ever happens very often because generally, who brings a consultant in — in this case Frank brought him in, but generally, the consultant's brought in through the suggestion of the person who's got the function that he's going to work in. Now whether the decision was made before he talks to the guy, at least he's part of the process. No, we use a lot of consultants and very successfully.

BARRETT: Do you think that over the period of these crises, particularly sort of beginning with the early eighties, Eastern did as good a job as it could have of persuading the employees of the seriousness of the problem?

AMOS: I think we did a better job communicating than the others because we accomplished give-backs and the rest of them didn't. So now whether we externally did as good a job, we sure as hell did better inside or we wouldn't have got all the give-backs in the eighties. Because TWA never got them and they were fighting for them. They didn't even try until after we had got two. So if you're saying did we do a good job someway of convincing the external people, because we must have convinced the internal.

BARRETT: Uh, huh. Or you wouldn't have gotten them?

AMOS: No. And I don't think you ever got good press after you give me $2 and someone talks to you. You're not as happy as before. I don't care who you are, you're not going to smooth that over. You can't even smooth it over with your wife if she asks for $10 and you're asking for something. But we're not made that way.

BARRETT: Its bad news, is what it is.

AMOS: Bad news and bad news wouldn't — its bad news because the employee isn't going to say that's the survival of the company. It's my $2 I gave to them and management's wasting it. And then when you go back for the third time, well, they're still wasting my money.

BARRETT: And they just bought 2 new planes or 10 new planes, or whatever.

AMOS: Yea. Because see, you want to remember that until only the last 3 years has there ever been a philosophy that accepts give-backs and it's understood as 02:20:00necessary. And when we first cut the first ice — except in small companies. I think the steel mill may have gotten some delays or something. The steel mills then — see, none of them got them until they had reduced the company in half. We never reduced and we still got them. You know, the easiest way to get kickbacks is to lay off half the damn people. You've got a different environment to sell someone. We were growing at the time we were saying give us money.

BARRETT: That's a hard thing to sell.

AMOS: And I want to tell you, that's tough. You can go back to any industry and close it down or lay off and then they'll start talking to you about giving money, I know of no situation, I'm sure there are. I know there's no company as large as we are that ever got anything back in '78 without a big layoff like half of the company. That's why I'm very impressed with Boeing's program. But 02:21:00that's a lot easier when you get 30 thousand people almost.

BARRETT: You really have people's attention then.

AMOS: Yeah. You can't even sell your kid on taking a dollar away from his allowance. I don't care who you are

BARRETT: You've done some recruiting for people like senior executives?

AMOS: All of it. Frank's delegated that very, very — I enjoyed — that's one phase I enjoyed. I don't think I've ever taken anybody to Frank Borman and he will spend, which is what most people will do, he'll spend 2 hours with them. He never questioned salaries. He never questioned what he had given in benefits. Never questioned what he had given a guy in movement that's your business. He just would meet him at the airport and spend a couple hours with him. And I'd 02:22:00usually only give him one and he would hire him. That was probably one of the greatest satisfactions I had with him.

BARRETT: I would think that would be at that level of confidence.

AMOS: Yeah, that's good satisfaction, like Leonard He was high on Leonard, but there were a couple others that I could have sold him on but I liked Leonard very much.

BARRETT: And McGraw, you reached out for him, as well. You recruited McGraw.

AMOS: He never would talk to anyone. He wouldn't - one thing that I really respected and enjoyed about Frank is that –

[Break]

BARRETT: Okay, we're back on.

AMOS: - he'd never get involved and we hired a lot of people — McGraw, for 02:23:00example. Now, he actually wrote a letter to Frank Borman and we had a search firm that sent us the social type of people and not what we wanted at all. He wrote a letter to us, to Frank, which Frank read and handed down to me. And since he was working for a member of our board — you know not directly, but he was their public relations guy for their, one of their largest divisions. Then I immediately got a hold of the board member and said we've got an application here and he looks pretty good and he let us have him. He let us start talking to him. And I spent a lot of time with him in talking about the organization and what we really wanted and we wanted a whole different type of a person. We 02:24:00didn't want a cocktail man. We wanted a manager. And we wanted a whole new image as best he could do it. And we wanted him to see what he could do internally and externally, upgrade our —. And he was by far the best man we interviewed. The consultant sent me dogs. They had big jobs and big named things, but they weren't what we wanted. They were people that would go talk to Senators and Congressmen and we didn't need that. We needed someone to talk to us and then talk to the press. And Dick was a good man. I didn't expect him to stay over 5 or 6 years, by the way. He wanted to do a good job for us and get his name in the press by using Borman. Had we had John Smith as chairman, we wouldn't have got him.

BARRETT: That's funny, that's funny.

AMOS: But I interviewed him, spent a lot of time with him, did a lot of reference checks on him and wrote either would write a 3 or 4 page -- my feel of his strengths and weaknesses and how he fit into our organization. That's very important. Is he compatible with the other senior people that report to Borman? First of all, is he compatible to Borman? And some people can't go with Frank's style because he's very demanding and very instant. You're not going to be relaxed with Frank Borman and you can't be afraid of someone as strong as he is because he's a very strong person. Now, a lot of people think strength like that is a fault. I like someone strong like that. But you can't cow to him or you are of no value to him.

BARRETT: So you'd have to make those kind of assessments as an insider who knew Frank.

AMOS: Yeah. You can't bring someone that wouldn't fit in with Frank Borman. I had 2 or 3 people I interviewed. Hell, they wouldn't last a week. Frank, Christ he'd of fired me the first week he'd work with them.

BARRETT: Fire you, that's right.

AMOS: Fire me before them. But Dick was a good man and Dick was from Washington at that time, around Washington. And Frank had a meeting. I wrote up a big report on him and I'm sure Frank talked to -- I'm trying to think of the former Secretary of Defense, Isn't that funny, I can't think of that. He was on our board and he was on my committee. The committee that I was on, not my committee. I'll think of it. I'm sure Frank talked directly to him. And Dick, which was a 02:27:00plus had spent 2 months traveling overseas with the Chairman of the Board of Serle, a chemical company which has since been sold. Don Rumsfeld — used to be former Secretary. Very powerful, very bright guy. A lot like Borman, a lot like Borman. And I'm sure Frank talked to him but I spent a lot of time. I interviewed him for 3 or 4 hours. I started them from birth and walk them right on through to where they are now. And that way you can find out -- you can see when they're slipping away from this area and won't talk about it, and slipping away from this instead of letting him control it, in a very informal type, just like we're chatting. And Frank was having some type of a meeting in New York and I arranged for him to talk to Dick at the hotel. And he spent maybe an hour with Dick and called me up and said, make him an offer. We hired him. And he did not 02:28:00get involved in salary moving which is good because he naturally wasn't as familiar — you know, nothing is a secret. And so he may well like him well enough to pay him anything and then we'd have 2 other senior officers

BARRETT: Complaining about that, yeah.

AMOS: So he has to fit, both from a personality and ability and style with what he's going in with, plus salary. And Dick, I think, did that.

BARRETT: Were there any others of the current senior managers that you were involved in recruiting?

AMOS: All, while I was there. I shouldn't say all while I was there when I became senior officer. But even before that I would do that for — Skinner is now personnel guy and Howard was lawyer. That doesn't mean they didn't run 02:29:00equally as good a department as I did. So I did most of that interviewing there. But I think, at least I know, since I became senior officer, which would have been the last 6, 7 years, 7 years or so. I think that's what it is. I hired all but I'm trying to think of who else was brought in. I don't think we brought any other — yeah, I can't recall. But I'm sure that if we brought in others, I would have been involved. And I was involved generally, and this is a real - makes it-- if a senior officer would go in to Frank and say I want to promote 02:30:00this individual and give him X-amount of increase, Frank wouldn't even have any more than a discussion by saying, go down and talk to Amos and both of you come up and let's have a chat about it. He would not because once he does that, then you don't have any strength because your whole job is to get a senior officer to cut out an officer or consolidate directors. And if you have the strength of the -- it doesn't mean that you have any more strength or he has more respect for you, it's your area. I couldn't go in and recommend anything in the financial area. He would run me out of the office. And finance couldn't come in and make any recommendations in the personnel area. He's very strict on that and that's a plus.

BARRETT: Oh yeah. That makes — I'd say so.

AMOS: You can't screw around. So he would always send them and that's why we 02:31:00were successful in getting all the reductions. Even after the New York deal, we consolidated and consolidated and cut and cut. But he always had to approve it. But it's a lot easier for me to get a guy to listen to me about cutting out 3 people.

BARRETT: That's for sure.

AMOS: With Borman behind you, because it's not going to happen if they don't think you have that strength. And that doesn't whatever level.

BARRETT: It's interesting that, just in our conversation here, we've referred to at least 2 people who were officers at Eastern who went on to be President of another airline.

AMOS: That's right.

BARRETT: With PSA, what is it?

AMOS: Pacific Southwest,

BARRETT: And the other one was?

AMOS: Mort Erlich, who's Executive Vice President. Now both of those left —

BARRETT: Where's Erlich?

AMOS: TWA.

BARRETT: Oh, TWA.

AMOS: Both of those were candidates for the presidency so as soon as Joe Leonard became President, those two were going to leave. One found another job and one resigned. Well, they both resigned but under different circumstances. Erlich thought he was going to be President. So Russ and rightfully so. So would I if I'd been around and was their age. You know, you know whether by your age, by your experience, whether you're going to —

BARRETT: Whether you're in the race.

AMOS: Why, hell yes. I was never in the race at age 40 because I don't have that breadth.

BARRETT: Howard was the other one that —

AMOS: He was never considered for a presidency. Would have never been at Eastern.

BARRETT: At Eastern, OK.

AMOS: He grew up a lawyer and I don't think he — I shouldn't say he'd never been. I think that he would have been considered, but I don't think he would ever have been President. Bill's about the same age as Frank and, you know, age has a big factor. No one thought Borman was going to leave, so if you were his age, what the hell are you dreaming about?

BARRETT: Why stay, yeah.

AMOS: You might as well leave reality, not dream. And Erlich and the other, Russ Ray, were what, 10 years less than Russ. That's a big difference. And you will remember, Russ Ray is President of an airline one-twentieth of Eastern Airlines. That's a hell of a big difference.

BARRETT: Oh yeah. That's certainly a —

AMOS: So you can't just say he's President of an airline. And Erlich is not President. There's a big difference being Executive Vice President in the field that you spent 10 years at Eastern than being the top man of the airline. So you got sort of apples and oranges.

BARRETT: Well, I've about run through the areas that I wanted to ask you about. Do you have anything that we missed that we ought to chat about a little bit?

AMOS: No. I think we — more than you want to hear.

BARRETT: No. I found it very interesting, worthwhile.

AMOS: I enjoyed very much 20 years of this. Very, very good. It's a good company, really. Lot of good people.

BARRETT: Did you ever look back and say you should have stayed at - up in New Jersey?

AMOS: No. No, no.

BARRETT: You thought it was a —

AMOS: No, it's the best thing that ever happened to me. The best thing that ever 02:35:00happened to me. I think it's one of the toughest managerial jobs that there is in any airline industry. It's the only company of any size that every employee has bumping rights all over the United States. Now Ford Motor Company can talk all about their corporate policies that they want to and Chrysler and all these big corporations, but they'll close a plant in Ohio and those people have no rights to any other job. And by God, that's a different managerial responsibility. They'd close a plant in Indianapolis and those people would go out on the street unless there's openings at another location or unless management wants to give them that right. But by contract –

BARRETT: Not required.

AMOS: No sir. And if we lay off one ramp man here, he can go anyplace in the United States where Eastern has, and if he's got the seniority, bump. And if you think that's not a chore –

BARRETT: Oh, my.

AMOS: Only industry that I know of that does that. And it's the only industry and this is important, that has instant contact with every other employee in the airline. Because all he has to do is pick up a phone, dial a code and talk to a California mechanic. They're not supposed to –

BARRETT: But it happens.

AMOS: You're damn right. So you're not going to put anything off on this group that doesn't know how it happened. And that's damn tough in personnel. Because the little old factor over here can persuade him to do something and you're not going to do that. Now, you're going to get more productivity and there will be little minor things, but you're not going to just - the work rules here are the 02:37:00same as over there.

BARRETT: So as a personnel type, when you're communicating with this group here, you know that other group's going to know about it?

AMOS: You might as well be on a loud speaker. You're not going to come here and bull shit them to do anything.

BARRETT: Interesting, it really is.

AMOS: Because instantly they're going to talk. Before I leave on a presentation - soon as I walk around there and say 2 or 3 things to people; before I go to the next station, and they know where I'm going on the next station. All they have to do is call someone in computer and say, where's Amos going from here and it reads out, I'm going such and such. Same way with Borman and everybody else.

BARRETT: No secrets at all.

AMOS: So they know why I'm going to Atlanta, before I get to Atlanta because they've just talked to someone here, either the management or editors, the rest of them. Because, see, all they have to do is have a print-out, they know where 02:38:00you're going. They know when you're coming. I don't think that — that doesn't bother me, that's not a big factor but it's just -- I know of no company that's tougher to manage. That's really from Frank's job on down. Not so much in finance, although it is for us because we talk more finance. In most companies, you know we deal more than 80% percent on finance in talking to the employees,

BARRETT: Yeah, that's a big a —

AMOS: But generally speaking, you know, Johnson & Johnson, I don't think those people ever heard the word finance in a meeting.

BARRETT: Well, you add to that just the transition in people's thinking that was necessary because of deregulation and the introduction of competition.

AMOS: Well, you still had that before. Deregulation isn't all of the airline's problem.

BARRETT: Oh, you mean there are other problems besides the deregulation?

AMOS: Yeah. Even without deregulation that airplane's going over to Atlanta and if it's 20 minutes in Atlanta late, you could have a problem here or over there. See, its different making that lamp.

BARRETT: OK, alright, yeah, yeah. It's the nature of the business.

AMOS: You don't have a single, you're part of something moving through the air. And it's hard to get attached to it, but there is an enthusiasm. And once you're in the airlines you never want to leave it. And everybody thinks its [inaudible] that's a big factor, its just – it's a different world you know. But you can get excited about an airline. I cannot get excited about making lamps. [Laughter]

BARRETT: Okay alright, yeah. Yeah.

AMOS: But you can get excited about it.

BARRETT: So that's something you really have going.

AMOS: Oh, big, big plus. Big, big plus. But is has its disadvantages. But I think more advantages than disadvantages. Makes you do — you're a different manager when you're talking to the - because you can talk to one person, you're talking to 40,000. Because, remember, someone from here left here in — practically in every city, probably. But it's an exciting business. I don't miss it. I'm glad to be out of it.

BARRETT: Oh, you do not miss it? You're enjoying retirement?

AMOS: Very, very much. More than I thought because I'm a very active-type person. But I was fortunate we sort of phased out. Johnson took over and I was over at the side with personnel for, I think 3 or 4 months and then did a lot of 02:41:00– I recruited Leonard after I had been relieved of the command or I was getting ready to retire, been relieved. And I didn't even introduce him to Johnson until after he was hired. But see, that was the responsibility Frank had said —

BARRETT: He would take care of that.

AMOS: It was Leonard, not McGraw. I may have said McGraw. It was Leonard. And I was still on special projects for Frank up until the retirement party at the end of July.

BARRETT: Getting to be almost 2 years ago now.

AMOS: Um hmm. I had a little problem while I was still living in Miami. I would not have been able to retire and stay in the home that I'd been in for 20 years. Be it too routine. Had to break that. Clock gets off, goes off in the morning. 02:42:00I'm in Sanibel. I have no worry about what happened to Eastern Airlines. But if you're –

BARRETT: Still in the same house?

AMOS: Yeah. That's hard to break.

BARRETT: Near the office, yeah.

AMOS: And, of course, we built our house here in Virginia 7 years ago and we've had our condominium in Sanibel since '72. So I've been getting ready to be 60 —

BARRETT: For quite a while.

AMOS: Yeah. So you have to get yourself ready, particularly with a 24-hour, 7-day a week business. But I enjoyed it very much, but I'm happy to be gone.

BARRETT: Well, this has been enjoyable. I really appreciate –

AMOS: One of the reasons, I think, that officers should leave at 60 and 62 — junior officers are supposed to leave at 62 and senior officers are supposed to leave at 60. You can get permission to stay longer which is fine. Wayne is staying after and I think that's excellent. You know, it would be terrible if he 02:43:00left, with the finance —. But I think it's time. It helps you recruit people underneath because they know that guy can stay until 65, 67, you know. They know that 60 most is senior officers. And on our retirement supplemental — see, we have regular retirement and we have an officer's retirement. If you leave at 59, you don't get anything. If you leave at 60, when you're supposed to, you get 2 retirements.

BARRETT: Oh yeah. That's a pretty strong inducement, isn't it?

AMOS: Damn right. Well, it's an inducement to get the hell out and it's an inducement to stay to 60.

BARRETT: Guess it works both ways, yeah.

AMOS: Which is what it's supposed to do. And it's good for the junior officers and directors.

BARRETT: Place to move up, yeah. OK. Well, thanks much. I appreciate your driving up or down from Virginia and taking this time and talking with me candidly.

AMOS: OK. I enjoyed it very much.

BARRETT: Good. Okay.