Solomon Barkin Interview 2

HELFAND: -- the power that the industry had and that you -- it was obvious to you that the industry, in regards to the textile code, had extended their power into the textile code. And it was obvious to you from the beginning. Could you say that very clearly? That -- I had asked you before. You know, were you surprised or frustrated and you said you weren't frustrated. It was -- that you knew about it from the beginning. Could you just, um... Could -- could you make that clear for me?

BARKIN: Well, we were... People in unions in the United States, when trying to advance unionization, realized that the employers in this country are deeply set against organization of workers and resisted, um, and, uh, developed all kinds 00:01:00of techniques for preventing it or demolishing this effort. They hire many different experts in the field of communication, law, economics, and, uh, seek, thereby, to frustrate any such effort. And obviously apply all kinds of pressures on their employees to discourage them and prevent them from, uh, being interested or believing in unions to the point where they frequently discharged people so they don't have to make any such judgment. And this has continued into the present day. You ask any employer, or most employers, if they had a 00:02:00choice would they rather have a union or not have a union in their plant and they will express it very explicitly that they don't want a union in their plant. It abridges their power and their authority and their rights of management. And, uh, they evidence it in many, many ways.

HELFAND: Now -- but back in thirty-- between '33 and the time of the strike, OK, like -- like you said, I -- you weren't -- it wasn't surprising to you that -- that the industry had as much power as they did when it came to the textile code because -- you know, because they constructed it. So if you could simply tell me, from your perspective, I -- that you were not -- that you knew 00:03:00-- that it was obvious from the beginning that they wielded this power over -- over the cotton textile code and that they weren't really going to give an inch to the workers, even though -- even though the code itself looked like it was there.

BARKIN: We were... We were all hoping that the government might be more persuasive and apply enough power to force them to shed and to set aside their prejudices and their unwillingness to accept unionization of workers. We depended on two forces. One, as I've said, government, and secondly the organization of workers and what we -- a common word in unionism is solidarity. The union is unity among workers at enforcing their power or as the Wagner Act 00:04:00said, become account --

HELFAND: We're going to have to cut -- (inaudible)?

(Break in audio)

JAMIE STONEY: Yeah.

HELFAND: OK. So it was -- it was obvious to us from the beginning that -- that the industry was going to be ab-- was going to be able to control the textile code and not -- and certainly not recognize the rights of workers. And so we could only hope that through public pressure and worker pressure that the government would turn around and say to industry, "Look, you're going to have to do it like this."

BARKIN: Yeah.

HELFAND: That's what you were saying and I imagine it leads up to the strike.

BARKIN: Well, the -- basically... When you organize a union in the United States you, uh, assume that the employer is not going to be friendly to your efforts. And, uh, therefore I've known many people in polite society who are 00:05:00employers who generally -- who are generally very liberal but, uh, when it relates to their own managerial rights are reluctant to share it with the workers' union. And therefore will use every tool at their command, even -- and some even to the extent of violating the law in order to prevent such union organization.

GEORGE STONEY: Now, how does that apply to '34?

BARKIN: Well, these southern employers -- the southern employers were all unanimous, practically, with the idea that they should resist unions. I'll give you a good -- a good, uh, measure of... When Sidney Hillman was chosen as, 00:06:00uh, director of the organizing committee for the textile union in '37, one of the first appointments he made was to appoint a southern unionist as his director for the south. This man was head of the printers' union, typographical union. He was well-recognized as a citiz-- public citizen, as a moderate man, as a stable unionist, and he had many contacts in employer circles to whom he could reach -- to whom he could reach and who might be able to dispel the 00:07:00ogre-like images which, uh, are generated about unions. This man was appointed southern director in part because of these qualities and it was hoped that he would persuade the industr-- the union -- the industrial leadership of the south to change their attitudes and to accept the law. Unfortunately he died before the end of 1937. But during his lifetime, from April to thirty-- to December '37, he won more than 50 elections and hardly got any employer in the south to negotiate an agreement.

GEORGE STONEY: Now, in '34 could you tell us how that power -- employer power demonstrated itself?

BARKIN: In various ways. First, if we organized a -- a plant they refused to negotiate a contract. And we lost many -- lost many contracts -- opportunities for establishing collective bargaining because the employers wouldn't agree to an agreement. And there was nothing in the agreements which we offered them which was un-- untoward and, uh, raised any real issues of policy. Secondly, uh, the employers combined and developed uniform policies among themselves to resist unions. Uh, one of the interesting episodes in the history of southern 00:09:00textile unionism was the way in which contracts were negotiated for the few limited number of plants where unions were established. A customary process was to announce -- to negotiate a contract in the north with the association in the north, Cotton Textile Association in the north, and then approach the southern textile manufacturers in ord-- uh, to adopt similar terms. And, of course, they resisted. And negotiations would be very protracted. Finally we would get one of the employers to, uh, agree to proceed toward negotiations and we'd reach a 00:10:00contract. We always found the sequence there afterwards very, very, uh, intriguing.

HELFAND: And I -- just if you could help us with one simple idea about the-- this power that the industry had in that you all knew that the in-- that you weren't surprised. You understood that the industry --

BARKIN: Well, the industry -- the management -- the managements of the -- of the text -- cotton textile industry controlled or substantially controlled the political machines in the state. It controlled the organization of the political system of the towns in which they were located. They controlled for the most part the -- the preachers and priests who were preaching in their local mill villages and the newspapers which were pr-- control-- published in their 00:11:00communities. And, of course, that leaves nobody who had any significant influence on attitudes and publicity and public re-- news in the textile south.

GEORGE STONEY: That's so good I want you to say it again. Make it a little smoother, would you please? The textile industry of the south...

BARKIN: Yeah.

GEORGE STONEY: So...

BARKIN: The tex--

GEORGE STONEY: (inaudible). OK.

HELFAND: But -- but --

GEORGE STONEY: Just -- just -- let -- yes, go ahead.

BARKIN: The textile manufacturers of the south were a closely-knit organi-- group sharing many opinions, many attitudes together and they had a common attitude, is to use their power in order to enforce their views and to exclude 00:12:00or prevent the rise of unions. They had power on the state government, which meant the legislature and the governor, and where needed they could get them to send in the National Guard, as they did in Georgia, the Carolinas, and Alabama when strikes occurred. They would control the local government so that they could control the police and fire departments. So if you had to -- you'll have -- had to get a -- they wanted to get an organizer out of town they had true officials, uh, as -- as their weapons and tools for executing that. They controlled the local church because they financed, in most part, many of the churches. They controlled the newspapers because in many cases they owned the 00:13:00newspapers. So you go on and relate to all the -- relate to all the civic and public institutions in the southern area as well as the, uh, economic agencies, the banks and the other industries. They were all forced to conform to the employers' -- southern textile employers' dictates.

HELFAND: Now -- now this power then extended itself because they controlled the textile code. They controlled this very legislation that was going to free up these textile workers, right?

BARKIN: Well, in the case of the NRA they were legally empowered under the -- under the code to administer the code and re-- refused, uh, the government's 00:14:00request to place any labor people on the textile authority.

STOREY: Now, could you talk about the role of women in the '34 strike?

BARKIN: Well, women's role was very central. They played a supportive role, um, in all communities because the strike required mass meetings, feeding, aid to people in distress, and other human qualities and the women always covered that -- those forces. Many of them were, uh, picket line, uh, people. The, uh -- the union -- women in unions are a very crucial force because they have a 00:15:00magnetism of their own and therefore, uh, are able to -- to act more in unison and also, uh, to, uh, uh, do some of the un-- un-- unwelcome chores that come into a battle on this picket line.

GEORGE STONEY: Now, because the textile industry was at that time -- at least half the people in the mills, I believe, were women. Did that make a difference?

BARKIN: Well, it is about 50% at that time.

GEORGE STONEY: Sorry, 50% --

BARKIN: Yeah, they varied from one period to --

GEORGE STONEY: Could you start again saying there are 50% women at that time.

BARKIN: Yeah. The, uh... They're -- they're --

GEORGE STONEY: I'm sorry. I have to interrupt you. You see, I want you to say at that time about 50% of the employees were -- in textiles were women and then go on from there. You have to say that first.

BARKIN: Yeah, there were about 50-- about 50% of the employees were women. It varied slightly from year to year. They, uh -- they were very -- on the whole you would find that women are very aggressive picketers and, uh -- and make a -- a create a spirit of, uh, unison, which is, uh, most helpful in the course of a strike. So, uh -- and, of course, they're bound together much more tightly than men do and the result is that they're a much more significant force in 00:17:00the strike episode.

HELFAND: Before we were at the table you said that if you don't have the army on your side you lose.

BARKIN: Oh.

HELFAND: Now -- but -- and you were talking about power, I think, in a specific sense and in a broad sense. So before you were saying the tex-- you know, the textile industry had all this power locally and then they had that power with this legislation and that -- with the textile code. And that then the textile industry didn't want to recognize the unions and that the only thing, I imagine, that was left for the workers was to -- to -- to use public pressure. Is that -- that's -- and to try to pressure the government to pressure the industry. Could you speak to that and --

BARKIN: Yes. That's --

HELFAND: -- relate that to the strike?

BARKIN: Yes. That's -- that, is, uh, unfolded in the course of the '34 strike. The, uh -- every time -- every moment in the course of the strike when 00:18:00the union was beginning to feel the, uh -- the, uh, resistance from political and other economic forces and official -- local officials, the union always turned to the government hoping that the government would provide them with relief from the strength and power, uh, of the employer's influence on the power groups within the community. So the -- uh, the union was in -- in every crucial area -- uh, point, always dependent on the government and if the government didn't respond sympathetically it was lo-- it was lost because the only weapon the union had was to keep on striking. And workers can't strike 00:19:00eternally. They -- sooner or later they have to -- they will be forced to surrender, uh, by the sure inability to endure without income.

HELFAND: So the statement that you said, if you don't have the army on your side --

BARKIN: Yeah.

HELFAND: -- you lose.

BARKIN: Well --

HELFAND: Could you say that again --

BARKIN: Yeah.

HELFAND: -- and tell me what you mean?

BARKIN: Now, one of the real forces, um, breaking strikes in the '30s and in the textile industry particularly was the militia. And as -- as we know from all the cases that the militia was called out, rarely does militia come out and support the demands of the union. They are generally called out to protect 00:20:00so-called property and militia, National Guard, are -- were called out in many strikes, cotton textile strike both in the south and the north. And in Georgia they even had a concentration camp maintained by the, by the militia of the state in which they packed in every textile worker they arrested and thereby greatly weakened the leadership for the strikes. And when you turned to other community-- and in Rhode Island we had the fierce battles where the governor used the militia and people were killed. I don't know an-- don't know how many people were killed in the '34 strike but it must -- strikers -- if my 00:21:00understanding is correct, and from the data I've read in the -- in the past, it well exceeds 25 workers who were killed and about five or seven militiamen who were killed during these strikes. But there are similar kinds of cases, let's say in Toledo, Ohio, uh, Minneapolis, San Francisco, Pacific Coast, all of these strikes, people were killed by the militia that had been called out by governors to destroy and resist unions.

HELFAND: So at that time what did you see as the missing link for the -- the textile workers union? You know, at the end of that strike what was -- what did they learn from it? What was...

BARKIN: Well --

HELFAND: I mean, and just -- if you could speak from your perspective having been -- been working there at the time.

BARKIN: Yeah. Well, one of the major lessons any tex-- any trade unionist learns is that you have to beware before you use your last resort, which is the strike, because this involved great sacrifice. Consequently you're likely to -- depending on the effect that you can have, depending on the individual circumstance, you're going to be very cautious as to how to call the strike and how long the strike endures. And therefore you're going to be more inclined to an incremental improvement in conditions of employment rather than 00:23:00absolute gains of a major kind in the course of one dispute.

GEORGE STONEY: (inaudible) convention (inaudible).

HELFAND: OK. Yeah. The convention in -- the decision to -- to strike -- to strike, big decision, the culmination came at the -- at a national convention --

BARKIN: In New York.

HELFAND: -- in August of 1934.

BARKIN: No, in New York City.

HELFAND: Right, in New York City. Could you -- could you tell us about that?

BARKIN: Well, the -- the order for a strike came at a convention in August of 1934 in, uh, New York City and at which the delegates all ge-- unanimously voted for the strike. It's interesting, as I have mentioned earlier, that early in the month of September or August, a strike began in Alabama. I think there were 00:24:00about 20 mills who unionized there at the time. And they called a strike. So you see the spirit, the identification of the time indicated that workers will not realize their ends unless they go to the bitter end of going on strike. So the atmosphere in the country as a whole favored using this tool when you finally find the resistance impenetrable. And that was the decision of the convention in New York which resulted in calling the strike.

HELFAND: Do you think that the workers ever had a chance? Did they believe that they had a chance with the NRA and the textile code?

BARKIN: Well, the workers hoped --

HELFAND: Particularly southern workers.

BARKIN: The workers hoped that they would have a chance but, uh, as history has told us it was never realized and it hasn't been realized to date. And, uh, that ultimately... While the current moods prevail in this country there will be only one way to make progress towards str-- unionization. Is if the government sets up a compulsory system of workers' representation in mills.

HELFAND: OK.

GEORGE STONEY: Well, great. Very good.