Robert Ragan Interview 6

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00:00:00

 ROBERT RAGAN: Maybe you know something that I know, don't.

JUDITH HELFAND: Look at me.

RAGAN: Well don't get me on yet. I'm still studying.

HELFAND: Oh, ok

RAGAN: Generally, I couldn't spell out all of them.

HELFAND: Why don't you talk about the parts that you do know and the parts that that have some relevance.

RAGAN: Alright, I'm very weak on this so you'll, you, you'll have to keep me going.

HELFAND: Okay.

RAGAN: If you can get me once in a while to look over.

HELFAND: Okay, okay.

RAGAN: Alright, how do we start?

HELFAND: Well, you know, the, the, the, point, the reason

RAGAN: You just ask me if I know anything about and --

HELFAND: Okay, I mean there's a direct relationship between recovery and the Depression and what they were trying to do with the National Recovery Act and the textile code and, um, what's real interesting to us is management's response to the Textile Code and the National Recovery Act.

RAGAN: Uh, I'll try to answer your --

00:01:00

HELFAND: Okay, do you want to tell me first what you were thinking and then --

RAGAN: Your, your question

HELFAND: We can backtrack would that be better?

RAGAN: Uh, yes. Uh, speaking of the National --

HELFAND: Okay, let's do that

RAGAN: -- Recovery Act, I think we generally know what that was, at was, I mean, we were in the Depression and that was the Roosevelt plan to try to get, to, industry and government to work together towards the mutual solution of getting this country out of the worst depression that we had ever been in. And I think, uh, you know, whether you agreed with everything that was in that act or not, generally, people, you know, wanted to make it work. You know, if it was law it was law, uh, and we're not gonna go into what the Supreme Court says that it was unconstitutional and all a that, let's, let's just stay at, let's, let's consider that it was the law of the land and I think the textile industry as well as other industries and the country tried to make a go of it. 00:02:00It was the law. And you know, they wanted to see recovery as much as anybody else. We'd been in a terrible depression for a long time, and from the National Recovery Act came the, uh, uh the uh, the Johnston Textile Code sometimes called the Cotton Textile Code. And uh, I know I've seen it referred to as code number one and code number two and code number three. Uh, there was --I think generally once it was out, and once people saw what it was, in the textile industry, they did not like it. Uh, it was confusing, I think probably the main thing, it uh the government hadn't decided how was it to operate, how is it to be, it was very confusing, and I know I have heard and seen that time after time at that time, in the beginning, it was very confusing to the 00:03:00manufacturers to know what to do and how to sell their products. One particular incident, that I think bares direct relationship on this also happen with my father and the Ragan Spinning Company in 1933, at the very worst part of the Depression. They had um, a very large order for uh, bobbinet yarn which went into a mosquito netting contract for the Army, and it was enough business to keep not only Ragan Spinning Company but another mill, Cramerton Mills at Cramerton, running, uh to employ 5-600 people and to keep them running for serval months. It was a big order, several million yards of it. Uh, the Ragan Spinning Company was one a the largest uh, manufacturers of bobbinet yarns in the South at that time, and they, it was a bidding contract and they made a very 00:04:00good, and a very good bid that to beat all of the American competition but unfortunately they were undercut by $65,000 by a English, by a English firm, who was to get the order. Well this was to draw a lot of attention from the trade association, from um, the government and everybody, as I understand it, it was important and interesting in the fact that it was one of the cases that sort of, uh, was, cause the trend, cause the trend in American tariff policy. Um, the reason that Ragan Spinning Company was going to lose that contract is that their, because of the Cotton Textile Code. Their cost were much higher than the 00:05:00English, and the reasons being English, and other foreign countries, could buy American cotton, same cotton our mills used, at a substantial discount to the price that Ragan Spinning Company had to pay for that yarn. Also, mills in Gaston County, at this time, paid general wages of um, $10.80, $13.80, and $14.60 per week for an 8 hour shift. Whereas the same the same mill in England, paid only $6.00. This was also, it was a minimum wage set by the, uh, Textile Code.

HELFAND: What about in New England?

RAGAN: No, I mean all over the country and New England and the, the, Northeast? Oh yeah, same, they were operating under the same code they were in the uh in 00:06:00the South.

HELFAND: And was that a difficult thing for you think, I mean, I mean for wages, for wages to be set like that --

RAGAN: A lot of red tape and the confusion of it and it was also something. And I don't know the details called the processing tax. In addition to all that there was something called the processing tax that domestic mills had to pay that foreign companies did not. And to go back to this, uh, interesting event that arose in 1933 with the uh, bobbinet yarn contract. Uh once, uh, we found out, uh the mills found out that they were going to lose the uh, the order to the English they immediately uh, contacted their congressman, involved was the Ragan Spinning Company, Cramerton Mills, which were the yarn manufacturers and a 00:07:00firm in New Jersey, and the um, I think it was John Bromley and Son's company, customer of Ragan Spinning Company that was going to knit the um, yarn, I mean knit the yarn into the mosquito netting. All of these companies were involved. Uh, so they went to their congressmen, uh, my father told me many times that uh, he went to Washington. Our congressmen just happened to be our neighbor across the street uh, in Gastonia. Uh Congressman Major Bullwinkle, an so he went to see Major Bullwinkle, Major Bullwinkle got in touch with the uh, State Department, Cordell Hull was the Secretary of State in the Roosevelt Administration, and one evening uh, at the invitation of Major Bullwinkle, my father, Major Bullwinkle, and Cordell Hull had uh, and Cordell Hull and Major Bullwinkle both lived at the Wardmin Park Hotel in Washington at that time, well 00:08:00anyway, they had dinner one evening just to informally discuss what had come up because of this contract and they explained to him that because of uh, Textile Code and having to pay higher wages, having to pay the uh, higher, uh, for American cotton and um having to do other things that that was the reason they were going to lose the contract and uh, Americans were going to be put out of work. And Cordell Hull said it was the first he knew about it that um, he tended to agree with the assessment and he made a statement that my father always said, he said I believe in a recip-- I think I'm correct, a reciprocal tariff that you know if, if, we, if the English have tariffs against us, we should have 00:09:00tariffs imposed on them. But anyway, all of this was discussed in that meeting and shortly thereafter an announcement came outta Washington from um Secretary of War, who was George Dern, D-E-R-N, at that time and uh, he announced that uh, uh some changes were made in the Textile Code and that the order, uh this particular order for yarn would be given to the Ragan Spinning Company in spite of the English company's offering $65,000 less for the same, for the same order.

HELFAND: And on a, on a domestic level, which is really some much of what our story is focusing on--

RAGAN: Right, right.

HELFAND: -- this is very um, I'm sure your father was having um, I'm sure it was difficult for your father to be dealing with a European issue and a domestic issue all at the same time. Do you think?

00:10:00

RAGAN: Well, that's part of the -- that's part of the uh, game. I don't I don't mean that's that story has been told over and over again the same the textile industry and other industries we've had that from time to time for many years since then since 1933.

HELFAND: The 1933 was so, I guess it was a milestone.

RAGAN: It was a milestone.

HELFAND: For textile workers

RAGAN: The National Recovery Act was new, the Textile Code was new --

HELFAND: Well, let's start with that that, that moment. That it was a milestone and think about it both from the management and workers, I mean workers got a raise, workers were working less hours. For them it was like, a big deal, I imagine, I mean it was a big deal. I don't think they had ever had legislation that spoke to how, you know, what their wages might be, don't worry we're not running --

RAGAN: Okay that's what I –

[break in video]

HELFAND: Okay, um, so you were gonna start with the National Recovery Act and 00:11:00the Textile Code right where you were.

RAGAN: Stop again, that what we been talk where--

[break in video]

RAGAN: It was a difficult --

HELFAND: We have to give Mikey 5 seconds, ok we're ready

RAGAN: The entire code was a difficult situation an and I think in the being it was confusing and uh, this tariff problem with the Ragan Spinning Company and the English competition I think was a small part of that problem. It was something that need to be worked out that had not been thought about before and as I understand it this was sort of a milestone in the uni-- in the America's tariff policy. As it tied in with the National Recovery Act at that time and I cannot speak to all of the details on it but I do know that it was a part of the 00:12:00American tariff policy. Uh, the uh, ya gotta sorta direct me here.

HELFAND: Okay yeah--

RAGAN: I'm sorry

HELFAND: I guess the direction that I --

RAGAN: Some of this we've talked about --

[break in video]

HELFAND:-- understand is the textile industry was first very excited about having the opportunity to be the architects of, of a code and legislation that would help them, um, maintain their industry better. Particularly, to help pull it out of the depression --

RAGAN: I can't speak to that, I don't --

HELFAND: Alright but --

[break in video]

F2: -- all industry --

[break in video]

RAGAN: He's got me where I've got to have my coat straightened out.

M1: Okay we're rolling.

RAGAN: I have the impression that, an it's only an impression, I was not there, in spite of how old I may look, was not there in 1933 when the uh, National Recovery Act started but I had the impression, probably from my father and other textile uh, leaders from that time, that even though they may have 00:13:00created, helped create the code, and uh, that there was so much confusion and uncertainty, uh, and maybe unfairness when it finally came out that they were um not real positive of it. That uh, they were just too many things such as uh, um I don't know whether the differential in the cotton price between an American buyer and a foreign buyer were part of it, but I'm sure that was, was never liked, never has been liked, never will be liked. But, I can't really give you any details because I wasn't there, other than the impression that they thought it was just a extremely confusing, frustrating piece of legislation that 00:14:00caused unnecessary red tape um in complying with it.

HELFAND: Now, we left off on the strike I guess it was around like day 3 or 4. Um, um do you wanna, I mean, um the thing, how, in terms of um, the guards and the guns and response to the mill workers, could you, how did that end up, I mean on manag -- could you speak to, I guess, sort of how they were able to use the mechanics of the guards and, and their deputies to really work for them?

RAGAN: Well I think it was a situation that worked. I think the mills and most of 'em did that had the guards around it were not bothered or vandalized. That's not to say that there were not other strikes. Yeah, all during this time, it maybe one particular mill. I know there were serval in Belmont that I 00:15:00remember, the Hatch hosiery mill was one of 'em. Several times, this is later in the week or next week or the following week that there were several thousand pickets around that mill. Now for what reason, I do not know. And it got very rough. Sheriff's deputies were called for and there were shots. I think there was one worker that was killed at that mill and several wounded, uh, and I cannot answer why this particular one received so much attention, except maybe they had started to work again and the union did not want the mill to work again. So possibly that was the reason. I just know that that was one where a lot of trouble uh, occurred in Gaston County.

HELFAND: Do you have a question?

F2: Oh yeah, um Mr. Ragan, you said that the day to day, after the first couple of days, kinda the same procedure happen on and on, then at the end of those 00:16:00events, about 22 days, 26 days, and the strike was finally ended you know. Uh, the union had come to an agreement with the government, but what the union felt was that in the end the management had never agreed to --

HELFAND: Well President Roosevelt promised the worker, so an a lot of the

RAGAN: Well and I can't really answer, I mean Mr. Montgomery is going to be a better source on, on that, on the specifics of what the government offered.

F2: Do you have any thoughts on how that strike ended and you know what?

RAGAN: I don't know the specifics of it, I just know as the strike went on, there were good days and there were bad days. And um uh um you know there were the National Guard was involved and some mills would start up and then they would stop again. And I think the strikers were eventually just worn down. And uh I'm sure there was behind the scene work with the government and the strikers and the American Cotton Manufacturers Association and Southern Comb 00:17:00Yarn Spinners Association were all working and negotiating together on what the solution would be. And I don't I don't know what promises were made but after so many days, there was 20 something days, less than 30 but close to 30 that it was finally announced that it was over and then each day more mills would start back to work again. And whether -- I understood that they did not reach their demands, they did not get all of the demands, or maybe even nearly all of the demands that they had requested but at least they were free to go back to work at that time. And I think, uh as far as I know, both side tried to work together and most people received their jobs back, I'm sure there were some who did not, I, I can't speak to that either.

HELFAND: That didn't happen at your dad's mill--

00:18:00

RAGAN: No, as I said and this was in the newspaper, the Gastonia Gazette, sent out a, a, reporter to you know report on that particular mill, because that was one were the very first or second day the strike flying squadrons did occur. So they were interested in reporting on that. When the workers came back, umuh and quoting the Gazette said there was not a, no one joined in the union from the Ragan Spinning company, and every worker, when the mill reopened, came back to work and had their job, just like they did before the strike.

HELFAND: I think I remember your father saying something about, he was talking about his community, that they were very loyal and he was very proud --

RAGAN: Oh,

HELFAND: -- of them or something, I think it was in the same article.

RAGAN: Well, we was very proud of the fact the mill was run running and its employees were being paid a fair wage. Uh and I think I had mentioned at the time that general wages in the better mills were $13.80, $14.80, and what was 00:19:00the other,6 uh, $15.60, uh for a week's work, 8 hours a day. And uh they were very proud of the fact that they were able to pay the going and above the going rates for work, and none of their people were on the relief rolls. They were all reasonably contented with their jobs. Being the Depression, there was a country store, I know, that was right across from the mill and they had arranged for credit to be given to the workers that lived in the Ragan village. That, you know, if a particular week they didn't pay, the mill guaranteed them payment, and guaranteed that it would be paid at some time. So, it was generally a, uh, prosperous, contented, or at least as contented as anyone could be during the 00:20:00Depression, part of the county.

HELFAND: That's great

[break in video]

HELFAND: (inaudible) doesn't it being the lead industry.

RAGAN: Oh I think definitely and it was by far the lead industry. And, and --

HELFAND: Let's start with the textile was the leading industry, certainly in North Carolina, and go back to the Civil War and then and then talk about that. And how it, particularly how it brought people, you know how it gave people so many jobs and its relevance to the state.

RAGAN: Okay, the a, textile industry at the time, of course it was the cotton industry in the a South, as you mention, was and is probably is still the largest and most important industry not only in North Carolina but in almost every southern state. And this go back to the Civil War, as we say in the South, 00:21:00the War Between the States. That after the war the South's economy was literally devastated. The old Antebellum agricultural, one crop agricultural system was in disarray. Uh, there were no, uh mean there was no money, there were no jobs, we'd been, we were defeated nation not only that, well I could go on and on that to there was a period of Reconstruction and uh if folks don't know what Reconstruction was it was worse than the war. It was everything but Reconstruction. It was uh, not a period of conciliation, like Japan and Germany after the World Wars had. It was a period when things were made worse in the South then they had been after the war. So they had to come through all of that, and the first industry the visionaries that decided they 00:22:00wanted to do something about it and to better the economic system of the South. Uh the cotton textile industry was the first and primary industry that developed in the South after the war. There was also tobacco, there was also furniture, they came a little later and they were never as large, but the cotton textile industry is really pulled the South out of a, a economic stagnation and brought it to the twentieth century. And all of this started uh, mostly after the Civil War. And um small mills were started, they were well, seemed to be well run. They made money and more mills were built, and these mills provided employment for people. The people at first came from the surrounding farms in the area, 00:23:00then they came from the uh adjoining counties and adjoining states, up in the mountain area. The more people were provided jobs, cash paying jobs, which they had not had before. And uh it was a salvation of the south at that time and the textile. It was s progressive industry, still a progressive industry. But it was a very progressive industry at that time. An uh was what brought the South back from the destruction of the Civil War.

HELFAND: You once told me that your father had told you that in the late 1800's you know as more mills were built, they started recruit more and more people --

RAGAN: Oh yeah, you ran out of people in the local area in the general vicinity. So you had to stretch further and further and finally it go up into the mountains of North Carolina and the mountains of Tennessee. And so people started coming out of the hills, down to the, down to the low country. To the 00:24:00Piedmont area was what it actually was.

HELFAND: And you were telling me before, we were talking a little bit about mill village culture and the construction of the houses, and the houses, and the need for houses. You were telling me before that that that there really was a need and that they create communities outta nothing.

RAGAN: Uh, there was an uh absolute need for the housing. That um, in the early days, without the hou-- I mean there were no, I mean let's take Gastonia, my hometown, as an example. It was a brand new town. Not many people are involved in a brand new town. It, it started in 1873. It was about the same time as the cotton mill started, it was a corn field. So, you know, the mill started, houses had to be built. If laborers came from the other areas, there was no housing 00:25:00there for them so you had to provide housing for them. And these were, uh were people that were independent farmers, they were family oriented. They were used to working as family groups. They were very clannish probably. Uh, from whether it was local vicinity or the mountains of uh North Carolina and Tennessee. So they were used to living with each other and in groups, so, and they much preferred to live in groups and communities which the villages became. But they required the housing and uh in the early days, the mills not only built the housing for them. They either charged them no rent or very low rent. Think maybe 25 to 50 cents per room was charged at some time. They received coal free. They used electricity later, and usually had electricity free. So it was a big plus 00:26:00for a family. And as I may have mentioned uh, my father remembered during the '20's when the Ragan Spinning company was started, to be able to get the help they need, you know, they may find a family that had one or two good spooler hands or a picker or two that they wanted, but those people would not come unless you had a job for their mother and their father and they grandpa and they grandma, and the grandpa and grandma had to have an easy job but you had to provide jobs for all of those so it was a it was a family type of environment and I think it was the type of environment that the workers liked and enjoyed, felt comfortable in it. They developed their own church, they brought their own religion, they grew their own vegetables, they had their own friendships and so 00:27:00the people were, I think, liked very much being in the mill villages. They were among their own so to speak, and they felt comfortable with that. Course now a days the mill villages have mostly been sold off or become a part of the communities and the mill villages literally created the towns. As in Gastonia, Belmont, Cramerton, Bessemer City, Kannapolis, uhh dozens and dozens of towns, all throughout the South were started as textile communities. And uh even in larger cities, uh like Charlotte, and Raleigh, and Durham, and Winston-Salem, and Atlanta and other places, the cotton mill villages became an integral part of that to of that city or to that town. So, uh the mills brought in the people, 00:28:00brought in money and the uh villages were built and the villages became part of the community and they uh, they shaped, they shaped the uh, format of the state. They shaped what the state was like, they shaped the type of people that was, was in it. I may not be saying that right but it became uh, part, a integral part of what Gaston County was or what North Carolina was, and this was shaped very much by the mill towns and the mill villages.

HELFAND: So was the, do you think the concept of unionization in '29 and '34 was a, was a, was a threat not just um, economically? Was it a bigger threat?

RAGAN: I don't understand.

HELFAND: I guess I'm kind of just wondering if that notion of you know, 00:29:00unionization was really, was something that had nothing to do with the way, um, the towns or the culture was conceived or, or, or, shaped like you were saying.

RAGAN: I still don't understand the question.

[break in video]

RAGAN: Well, I think and probably, maybe the local people, and here again I'm turning it around and asking rather than giving the question, maybe the local people did not understand all a that, and the national organizers, this was what they were trying to tell them. I'm sure they understood it at some point and even, after understanding that unionization still did not take roots in the South for whatever reason historians tend to, to say that that was.

HELFAND: I, I, I think some, some historians might think it's because the industry was really able to, say no. I mean that the industry was really able 00:30:00to, to use the means that they had right there. The National Guard or uh, you know a certain type of power, deputizing --

RAGAN: Well now the National Guard did not make people go back to work. It only protected those people who wanted to work at that time. I think that definite. They did not force anybody back it was only there to protect -- and the Governor made a statement at the time he said that, I wish I could quote it right now, and you have it in writing. But that there is just -- the right to work is just as important and will be respected by this state as the right to organize. They recognized both, but he also made the statement that the right of those who want to work is there too and this state will protect those rights.

00:31:00

F2: I think that one of the points that Judy was getting at, was since the textile industry was the largest industry, wasn't that like a power that management had (inaudible) source of income?

RAGAN: Oh I'm sure it was. It was definitely many people's only source of income and it was a big and powerful industry in the South. But let's also go back and look at it in the context. This was nineteen hundred and thirty-three in the midst of the worst depression the world has ever known. And half of them, more than half of the mills in Gaston County were not able to run at all. Um, I mean there was no business there. They couldn't run if they wanted to run. In Gastonia there were only a – I could name them on two hands -- of mills that were finically able to run during the Depression. The others, almost 00:32:00every one of them, were, had taken bankruptcy in one form or another, and a company called Textiles Incorporated took over all of these bankrupt mills. In the time we're talking about they were operating under receivership. They did not literally come out of receivership until 1941, seven or eight years after the period we are talking about. So uh they, uh—

HELFAND: Whoops.

RAGAN: Did something—

[break in video]

RAGAN: Ok well I understand what you're saying and yes the textile industry had a lot of power. It was a large employer of people in the country, a million or whatever it was at that time. Uh but here again we have to go back to the context of where we were. We were in the middle of the worst depression the world had ever known. Half of the mills in the country probably either weren't 00:33:00running or were only running a few days. And Gaston County, and here again I can speak better to what was taking place there, half of the mills were not running or were in bankruptcy, and the city of Gastonia were there were forty or fifty -- forty or fifty mills there at that time. More than half of them were in bankruptcy in one form or another. They weren't running at all some of them. The two largest chains of mills had gone bankrupt and a company called Textiles Incorporated had adsorbed these and were operating under receivership. They were operating something like 300, 400,000 spindles in the city of Gastonia. It didn't come out of receivership until 1941, seven years after the period we're talking about. There were only, and I can name them on two 00:34:00hands, maybe one hand. Five or six or seven mills in Gastonia that were running full time. So you know the power, if you want to call that, the people who were striking were already out of work. I mean there was, I mean what was –- the management –- they had no leverage without management. I mean the management couldn't hire them it they wanted to hire them. They couldn't hire them at half the price. They were operating -- this national textile strike occurred during the Depression, which I think is a bad time to have strike. You don't have the power, you don't have the leverage. When is the best time to have a strike or anything of that sort? It's when business is good. When you've got everybody's attention. When closing a mill down or closing a factory down is gonna mean something. If you're already unable to run or very slightly able 00:35:00to run then closing them down is no further economic hardship to them. So this was the environment they were in and the power and the leverage was not there during that time I don't believe.

HELFAND: Do you think if 200,000 Southern textile workers, this is what we've been told, organized themselves into local unions, that, that that would get some attention?

RAGAN: Then or now?

HELFAND: Then!

RAGAN: Say that again?

HELFAND: If 200,000 Southern textile workers joined or tried to organize local unions, I mean I --

RAGAN: We had 600,000 that tried supposedly at that time. Well on strike, they were all trying as a matter of fact probably very few of them were trying to actually organize. Certainly they wanted some advantages, they wanted some 00:36:00concessions, but here again most of the people were on strike and as my understanding was the ones that were out of work to begin with. Not all of them but a great majority of them, the ones that were working were not taking place in this strike.

HELFAND: I um, we did research just to figure out were some of these locals were --

RAGAN: Right.

HELFAND: I don't know if I ever showed you this. This was just in North Carolina, these were all the local unions that organized between 1933 and 1934 at the time of the strike.

RAGAN: Yes the first one I see is Flint Groves that's part of Gastonia. That's one of the plants there, two the Flint and the Grove. (inaudible)Local union, Charlotte, Shelby, Concord, Lumberton, Gastonia (inaudible) I think that's in one of mill areas. Bessemer City that's in Gaston County. Belmont. 00:37:00North Belmont. Brookford, that's up near Hickory that's where one worker was killed, someone was killed during the strike. Cramerton, so many of these are in Gaston County. Stanley. Gastonia. South Gastonia. Lowell. Mount Holly. South Gast – I don't see any West Gastonias. North Charlotte. There are a lot of them.

HELFAND: What do you think of it?

RAGAN: Well they were obviously doing a good job of getting organized. You can't organize without someone in each community or each mill, uh, having a 00:38:00representative. But here you are talking about 20 or 30 names out of tens of thousands that work in the mills. I don't know if that was a large number or not.

HELFAND: This just represented each local.

RAGAN: Just the local union?

HELFAND: Yeah. And so there might be a 100 names attached to it or 300 names attached to, or 15 names attached to it, or a 150, but I think this represented a good—thousands of people in just North Carolina – which is sort of amazing.

RAGAN: Well if you're a union you've got to have a thousand out of what? 50,000, or 75, whatever was at that – in North Carolina let's say the number was 50,000, and I think that's a conservative number, if you had a thousand organized workers, who actually took the time and had the interest to sign the 00:39:00piece of paper that said I will support the union. Is that a large amount? Is that the union would be satisfied to say that we've got enough power to go in and get our demands met? I don't believe even a thousand would be considered a great number. But that's my opinion.

HELFAND: Well, I, I, I, think that there was more than a thousand at the time. That's, that's, that's the thing that's sorta struck everybody, is that they came out in such numbers. And um --

RAGAN: Well I'm sure. Maybe. I wasn't there and I can't answer. That of how surprised people were.

HELFAND: So in the end, for this moment --

00:40:00

RAGAN: In the end everybody finally went back to work. And the ones back to work that could find work. But it was still seven years later before everyone who wanted a job could get a job. Not just in Gaston County, all over America

HELFAND: Economic wise.

RAGAN: Economic, yeah to have a job and make demands, you've got to have someone who is capable and willing to employ you. And so many companies where not hiring at that time. Were not fully employed.

HELFAND: Do you think if the union had been able to get a class at the time what do you think—how do you thinks things would be different now if they had been able to get past in all those numbers.

RAGAN: I don't know that it would –-I can't answer that. It just depends on what the demands were. And what demands -- if I recall correctly they were 00:41:00asking for –- this was in the Depression and sixty or however many years ago, sixty years ago they were asking for a 30 hour week then. Is that correct? That –

HELFAND: Yeah.

RAGAN: But even today we don't have a 30 hour week. So I think that was a request that was unreasonable. And, uh, the request of the union or at least what was in the national Textile Code was a minimum wage of $12.00 a week. Now that's hard to believe, I was getting ready to say an hour, but uh, some of the mills pay $12.00 an hour now, but it was $12.00 a week back then and that was a fair wage. The mills that were running were paying $12.00 a week. I quoted some figures earlier of $12.80, $13.80, $14.60, um they were. And I 00:42:00think I mentioned also there were a few mills paying 4 and 5 dollars a week and that was wrong. And that was unfair. And people knew that. But the demands, the demands maybe were not reasonable at that time. And that may have been partly the reason that the strike failed, is that some of the demands. And certainly in the context of time, within a depression, to ask for a 30 hour week. The wages I don't think would have been that big a problem at least in the better run mills as I understood it they were already paying those wages. It was some of the mills, the stretch-out, yes, was a situation and needed to be addressed, and I think that probably, if the strike did nothing else, whoever 00:43:00was pushing the stretch-out to the maximum, I think those managements were smart enough to see they had over done the situation and they backed up and reversed that trend. I would think, I don't that for a fact. And I would mention at the Loray at one time that the stretch-out had been such a big part of that strike, they recalled -- that management recalled the superintendent and put in another one.

HELFAND: Um one of the things I know they were striking against was because the NRA, they had said that they had the right for collective barraging and that right was guaranteed. A lot of them had been fired and discriminated against, you know over that period of time because they did join the union. And they were trying to get recognition, and not, and not be allowed to be fired.

RAGAN: Right I don't know that, I wasn't there, and I don't know the solution but I would imagine that management took the position that they did not want to be bound by that requirement. And, and I think that's the way that it 00:44:00turned out. But competition itself produced for workers much of what they requested over the years. That American industry of all types has to compete with other types of industry and pay fair wages and I think that is a very critical fact. Put the Depression behind us, there were a lot of things that labor requested and could not get, things that management wanted to do and could not afford to do. Once the Depression is over and things are more normalized, and companies are making more money. Most of them that I know of paid decent and fair wages, and they kept up with demands of labor. They kept up with 00:45:00inflation, the exceeded inflation, and they paid fair wages and have up until this day. I think that is a very important reason that unionization did not take hold in the South. Even after the 1930s. You know they could have tried again in the 1940s, and '50s, and the '60s and the '70s. But voluntarily management paid, and I know that's true in the better run textile mills today, they have a very elaborate personnel departments. They do everything in their power to keep people happy. Just as banks do, and governments do, and anybody else that hires people. They hire a lot of people. They pay fair wages and have good clean conditions for them to operate in. And I personally remember going through mills in the 1950s and the 1960s and this was before the day of air conditioning and they were hot and people were worked hard, conditions were not as good. There was more lint involved in everything. Nowadays if you walk 00:46:00in a textile mill and I'm associated with a group of mills, and it's modern and as nicely run as nay in the country. It's entirely different. The help looks happy, they dress neatly, they're paid well, they conditions are good. All of the mills are air conditioned. They have fringe benefits, they have retirement plans, they have insurance. Um health insurance paid for them. And so the situation is different. This is -- the industry is not only kept with these types of personnel demands, but they probably have exceeded them. If they had not then the unions would have found a seed for making unionization effort again. But they have not found that seed. They have not found that necessity, 00:47:00in my opinion.

HELFAND: Two more questions.

RAGAN: Okay.

HELFAND: Um you know a lot of people have used the term linthead. You know that --

RAGAN: Yup I know it very well. Linthead and mill hill and I was brought up -- and you haven't even asked me the question yet. But I immediately –- I was brought up to find those statements if they were said in a derogatory way repugnant. We were taught by my mother and my father that the only difference between us and them, or myself and them or you and them is what we're doing and the ability. They were good hardworking, honest, law abiding, Christian people. They did a good job and the term we were told not to use, my father 00:48:00never liked to hear that term used in the house. Or anywhere else. But yes the term was used. But what was the question specifically about it?

HELFAND: Well --

RAGAN: Why the term linthead, do you? It was in the old days there was a lot of lint produced in a cotton mill. And that lint, you can't help it. In the old days the workers worked long hours, they worked in un air conditioned factories. They wore overalls. And all during the day this lint from the cotton was blowing through mill and there was no way that it can't get on you. You know the president of the mill, if he walks through, he's gonna have lint on his nice suit when walks out. That was just the way it was. Now it's all different, that they got technological advancements, and the air suction 00:49:00machines take all of that out of the air, and the machinery itself has been improved and modernized. And the machinery doesn't produce as much lint, so you see very little lint in the mills today. Than synthetic fibers do not give off the lint that cotton fibers do. There was a very good reason if anybody had lint on them or in their hair because they were operating around lint.

HELFAND: I'm gonna bring that up too—

RAGAN: Well it was a degro—people used it in a derogatory manner as anything racist or anything else. People can find something and take that and make fun of it. And I guess people did try to take the term linthead and make fun of it. It wasn't right and it shouldn't have been done and most people that were involved did not think that way.

HELFAND: Actually um, sorry.

00:50:00

RAGAN: I still haven't answered your question cause still haven't asked the question.

HELFAND: The question I'm gonna ask, and I'm not trying to put words in your mouth, not at all, but because I know that the mill owners, you know had set up these communities and had a very close relationship to their employees --

RAGAN: They knew them by name. Most of them they knew by name. They could go out in the factory and call them by name. They knew their family, they knew their wife, they knew their daddy. Knew where they lived.

HELFAND: Knew where they came from.

RAGAN: Know where they came from.

HELFAND: So was it an insult to think that a worker that was so close might join, might think about needing a union?

RAGAN: I don't think it was an insult. I think it was strictly business that uh, I think management obviously saw it that it would be to their determent to 00:51:00have unionization. For the standard reasons that managements today consider it a determent. That uh, and I think they genuinely felt that it did not produce for the working men. Now here again we go back to the Depression. You know you have some out of work that have no job and no income, but the ones that were at work earning as good the minimum textile wage from the textile code, or better, were not gaining anything from it. And you'll have to ask someone in the actual management of a company now, why do you not want unionization. And I can't give you the answer that you want to hear from me that and you know you're not putting words in my mouth. But management obviously felt that they 00:52:00could do a better a better job of it than unions can. I think their right and I think that history has proven them right. At least in recent times. That's what we've just discussed earlier, that the companies, that the progressive companies have done a better job for the employees than the unions have done or can do. Here again we are getting a little of the subject, if you followed the truckers' strike very recently, I think that points some of these things home to you. Just they are not as able to do as good a job as the companies themselves for those workers.

HELFAND: How do you think your dad would feel about you bringing up topics he wasn't comfortable talking about.

RAGAN: Oh he would probably wonder why I was doing it.

F2: Actually could you--

RAGAN: Deep down he had some historical interest in him too. I don't think we've discussed anything that would embarrass him. And I think when we've talked privately I knew my dad all my life of course and I think he was as 00:53:00genuine and honest, good a person, not only with his family but with the help at the mills. And nothing was ever done or would ever be done that would purposely hurt them. I think it was genuinely, he and other management felt the way they were running it was as good or better than the unions could do it. And nobody likes to have their hands tied, to say how they're going to run their company. And in some ways that is what a union does to you. But here again I go back to the management itself and only, you'll have to figure out this or anyone that's interested in this interview. Has done a very good job in the textile industry and in other industries themselves without being hampered by the 00:54:00unions. And I think this is one of the very strong points of why unionization has not taken strong hold till this day.

HELFAND: Do you think people are afraid?

RAGAN: Of what?

HELFAND: Are they afraid of trying to join one or they afraid of—

RAGAN: No I think all of that is out blown. You haven't got somebody standing in the mill office that's hold a tape recorder, or finding -- trying to find out, or trying to hurt you or anything else. And on the other side just as well, I don't think the -- unions have been cleaned up. Unions used to be very rough now, this is another subject. I think that most of them are very law abiding respectable organizations now. And I think that the two can talk and get along very well. But this is not a subject I'm an expert on.

00:55:00

HELFAND: And, and that's not what we're really talking about.

RAGAN: No. no.

HELFAND: So.

RAGAN: But you ask the question, or I think you asked were people afraid?

HELFAND: People afraid.

RAGAN: But I don't see, I asked why? I don't see any reason that they should be afraid of it.

HELFAND: I think um, a long time ago, particularly after the '34 strike people got very frightened. I think they got frightened of – I think they were frightened of the, the ramifications of what could happen if they did join a union cause they saw that—

RAGAN: Well listen, here again I was there and I don't disagree with that but I go back to the contention that the ones that were striking, they were not working anyway. And the others that were working they took an election, and there was an election on both sides, they took an election at the mill during the strike. We're getting a little bit hazy on the subject now, the ones that 00:56:00wanted to work could work. Sure everybody would have liked to made more money, the mill owners certainly. There weren't profits back during the Depression. They were very, very fortunate to break even in those mills that made a little bit of money. And this was pointed out, what in the newspapers, and what is the book I'm trying to think on that was written about this very subject that time? Millhands and Preachers? Who was the author on that, it escapes me at that this time. This was one of the things he pointed out that maybe heretofore before the Depression, mill owners were always crying you know were not making enough profits, we're not doing well enough, we just haven't the money to pay more wages. And when the big strike came, by dog even he admitted they were 00:57:00absolutely right finally. They weren't crying wolf anymore. That they did not have the money. That there was not the business there to meet every demand that was requested.

HELFAND: Uh, I think we did it. I think—

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